Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Communication Theses

Department of Communication

Spring 5-2011

Communicating with the World: History of Rhetorical Responses
to International Crisis and the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
Laurel R. Berryman
Georgia State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_theses
Part of the Communication Commons

Recommended Citation
Berryman, Laurel R., "Communicating with the World: History of Rhetorical Responses to International
Crisis and the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication." Thesis,
Georgia State University, 2011.
doi: https://doi.org/10.57709/1721778

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Communication at ScholarWorks @
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Communication Theses by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@gsu.edu.

COMMUNICATING WITH THE WORLD: HISTORY OF RHETORICAL RESPONSES
TO INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE
2007 U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

by

LAUREL ROSE BERRYMAN

Under the Direction of Dr. Mary Stuckey
ABSTRACT
Following the events of September 11, 2001, we have seen a revival in American public
diplomacy. I argue the U.S. continues to rely on similar rhetorical responses to crisis that are an
essential part of American public diplomacy interconnected through history, from the birth of our
country to the recent 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication. Tracing this recurring rhetorical process from our founding to the Carter
Administration illustrates our reliance on similar rhetoric despite changing contexts. I use
Burke‘s concept of identification and the interrelated use of ethos and enemy construction to
demonstrate the rhetorical parallels between the Carter Administration‘s 1979 Communication
Plan with Muslim countries and the 2007 NSPDSC. This analysis not only contributes to the gap
in public diplomacy research but provides insight into American public diplomacy since 9/11.

INDEX WORDS: Public diplomacy, Rhetoric, Communication, Identification, Enemy
construction, Ethos

COMMUNICATING WITH THE WORLD: HISTORY OF RHETORICAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE

2007 U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

by

LAUREL ROSE BERRYMAN

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts
in the College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University

2011

Copyright by
Laurel Rose Berryman
2011

COMMUNICATING WITH THE WORLD: HISTORY OF RHETORICAL RESPONSES TO
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE
2007 U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PUBLIC DPLOMACY AND
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

by

LAUREL ROSE BERRYMAN

Committee Chair: Mary Stuckey
Committee: Carol Winkler
James Darsey

Electronic Version Approved:

Office of Graduate Studies
College of Arts and Sciences
Georgia State University
May 2011

iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Mary Stuckey for all the help, time and inspiration she has
given me throughout this process. In addition I want to thank Dr. James Darsey and Dr. Carol
Winkler, who have intellectually inspired me. I would also like to thank Pauline Rose Clance,
Nancy Zumoff and Lanier Clance who have continued to listen and encourage me despite my
frustrations, supporting me in every possible way. I am deeply grateful for my friend, Amy
Rovere and the endless amount of time she spent not only editing my chapters but listening and
helping me work through my thoughts. I would also like to thank my wonderful and supportive
partner Eran Ayal for the continuing love and positive encouragement he continues to give me.
Finally, I want to thank my parents for their love and support and instilling in me a deep interest
in the world that continues to inspire me.

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

iv

CHAPTER
1

2

Introduction: Understanding American Public Diplomacy

1

Rhetoric and Post 9/11 Public Diplomacy

8

Understanding Public Diplomacy

11

The Current Context: Public Diplomacy in Post 9/11 World

13

Methodology

26

Chapter Preview

30

A Brief History of American Public Diplomacy from our Founding
to the 1979 Iran Crisis

31

An American Convention

33

Reaction to the World Wars and the Increasing Use of Public
Diplomacy

35

The VOA

37

The OWI

38

The Challenges the of Cold War Bring Public Diplomacy Forward

39

The Carter Administration and Public Diplomacy

45

Iran Crisis

46

Communicating with Muslim Countries

50

The Text

51

Identification

52

Enemy Construction

54

Ethos Enhancement

55

vi
Conclusion
3

56

Rhetorical Identification in the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
Major Themes in the NSPDSC
Overview of the Rhetorical Workings in the NSPDSC
Framework of Ethos

61
63
65

Ethos in NSPDSC

66

Finding Substance or Common Ground

70

Joined but Simultaneously Separated

73

Enemy Construction

77

Victim/Savior

77

Encouraging Action

79

Uniting Against Common Enemy
While Maintaining Differences

80

Isolate and Undermine Violent Extremists

83

Messages Specific to War on Terror

86

Evoking Ideology

86

Rhetorical ‗Othering‘

90

Conclusion
4

58

Looking to the Future Public Diplomacy in America
Remaking History
Problems/Shortcomings with Recurring Rhetorical Process

94
96
99
101

Focus on Common Values

102

One-way Communication

105

vii

Works Cited

Implications for Public Diplomacy Research

107

Closing: Lasting Public Diplomacy

108
110

1
Chapter 1:
Introduction: Understanding American Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy is one of the most salient political communication issues in the 21st century.
Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor 1
From the conception of our country until the end of the Cold War, public diplomacy was
an important part of American foreign policy (Galal 2). At the end of the Cold War, Americans
started to become less involved with issues of public diplomacy thus leading to decreased
funding and eventually the merging of the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the
Department of State (Melissan 6). In a Congressional Research Report by a specialist in foreign
policy, Susan B. Epstein explains that we became complacent following the Cold War. Congress
and former administrations disregarded the need for public diplomacy, and it became ―viewed as
having a lower priority than political and military functions‖ (2). The merging of the USIA,
decreased funding, and the favorable U.S. image prior to 9/11 are all factors that contributed to
the loss of value and effectiveness in public diplomacy during this time (Rugh 156-157).2
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, public diplomacy has again become an important part of
the American way of thinking (Melissan 6). This ―revival‖ in American public diplomacy, is a
result of the political climate since 9/11 and our war on terrorism with ―anti-American/West
Islamic militants‖ in the Middle East, primarily in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq (Snow and Taylor
ix). Since 9/11, there have been various programs initiated by the U.S. government to inform,
1

Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor. ―Preface and Introduction.‖ In Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy. Eds.
New York. Taylor and Francis (2009): 3-11.
2

Also please see ―Views of a Changing World: How Global Publics view War in Iraq, Democracy, Islam and
Governance and Globalization,‖ June 2003 by The Pew Global Attitudes Project which shows a major decline in
worldwide opinion following 9/11. Report can be found at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/185.pdf.
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engage, and influence people worldwide about American values and interests. As a country, we
have taken a greater interest in the study, practice, and future of public diplomacy following the
9/11 attacks. Evidence of such interest can be seen in various reports on public diplomacy, which
have been published not only by government agencies, but nonprofit organizations, universities,
corporations, and academic communities (Snow and Taylor ix).
This thesis will demonstrate the importance that analyzing public diplomacy rhetoric can
serve and further help curtail the current lack of rhetorical analysis within the majority of public
diplomacy scholarship. It is important to look at public diplomacy from a rhetorical viewpoint
because ―public diplomacy is, at its core, a necessarily suasive endeavor, concerned with the
influence of foreign audiences and the modification of their behavior in some way‖ (Gerber
123). I will analyze and draw specific attention to the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC) which is important because it is the first
comprehensive strategy for creating identification in U.S. history. I will further argue that this
document illuminates the history of public diplomacy and shows us how we keep recreating the
same tactics/appeals since the founding of our nation. We know a great deal about how
presidents react to foreign policy crises, 3 but have produced very little scholarship on how the
executive branch‘s bureaucracy has rhetorically responded to international crises with such a
strategy. This thesis is one effort to begin to close this gap.
According to the University of Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy, there is
no agreed upon definition for public diplomacy. Governments, scholars, and practitioners all
have their own varying definitions of public diplomacy (―What is Public Diplomacy‖). The
working definition the Center proposes is: ―the ways in which governments (or multi-lateral
3

See The Presidency and Rhetoric of Foreign Crisis by Denise M. Bostdorff. University of South Carolina. 1994;
The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric. Eds. Amos Kiewe. Preager. 1994.
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organizations such as the United Nations), acting deliberately, through both official and private
individuals and institutions, to communicate with citizens in other societies‖ (―Defining PD‖).
The U.S. State Department Web site states that the goal of ―American public diplomacy outreach
[…] includes communications with international audiences, cultural programming, academic
grants, educational exchanges, international visitor programs, and U.S. Government efforts to
confront ideological support for terrorism‖ (―Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs‖). In short, our goals can be conceptualized as interacting and communicating with
foreign nations in order to advocate alternative thinking and diffuse threatening extremist
philosophies, which are materialized through a variety of communication outlets. There is
widespread agreement on the importance of American public diplomacy, but, as a nation, we are
still on a quest for its most effective form.
William A. Rugh of Georgetown‘s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy argues that we
must not think of public diplomacy as the ―panacea‖ of foreign policy, however, it is vital to not
dismiss its importance (Introduction, 1). He draws attention to the importance of public
diplomacy by pointing out the 2004 Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Public
Diplomacy that stated, ―In government throughout the world, public opinion greatly influences
the direction of policy‖ (qtd. in Rugh 1). Public diplomacy practices are facing some inevitable
changes due to technological advances and changing attitudes. However, many of the strategies
and tactics overwhelmingly remain the same (Rugh, Introduction 3).
In moving forward the U.S. must be ―fully aware of past and present approaches […] we
should not try to reinvent the wheel‖ (Rugh 3). A 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Report
found that we have spent close to $10 billion on various communication endeavors to forward
our goals, but ―foreign public opinion polling data shows that negative views toward the United

4
States persist despite the collective efforts‖ of the variety of U.S. government agencies (―U.S.
Public Diplomacy: Key Issues‖).
Although this report does not reflect the change in public opinion that occurred after
President Obama was elected, Nancy Snow, a public diplomacy scholar, notes goodwill towards
the U.S. cannot be sustained solely by the new Administration. Snow argues it is unrealistic to
think that successful public diplomacy projects can be secured by a few who hold high ranking
appointments (Snow ―The Death of Public Diplomacy‖). Despite the fact that the ―Obama
Effect‖ led to more immediate positive global opinions about America, Snow explains, ―it‘s a
dangerous path on which we tread,‖ for we have yet to receive a new public diplomacy strategy
by the Department of State and the newly appointed Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs (Snow ―The Death of Public Diplomacy‖). Currently we face a ―golden
opportunity‖ to capitalize on any positive opinion and credibility Obama created. It is critical we
seize this moment, or we may not succeed at redefining America as a non-hegemonic power
(Snow ―The Death of Public Diplomacy‖).
One of the most important places for President Obama and the Under Secretary of Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs to make positive and lasting changes is in crafting a new strategy
for public diplomacy and strategic communication. A 2009 report by the Government
Accountability Office titled ―U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight‖
explains that a new national communication strategy is critical for the Obama Administration
and Congress (1). The report further explains that the ―National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009 required that President Obama issue a new comprehensive strategy by
December 2009 to guide interagency efforts‖ like the June 2007 national communication
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strategy. 4 For our country to maintain any goodwill gained by the 2008 election, a reworked and
more effective national communication strategy would prove useful. The ways in which the U.S.
communicates with other nations worldwide must remain a priority by the Obama
Administration in order for us to change our image and reach our greater goals. The 2007 U.S.
National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication not only can provide a
valuable foundation for informing forthcoming initiatives but is essential to understand because
no plan in U.S. history has been conceived to provide a comprehensive strategy to communicate
American values and create identification with foreign audiences.
The 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
was not surprisingly one of the most anticipated strategies in the post 9/11 public diplomacy
efforts (Dale). This strategy was developed under former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. During her term, she formulated a policy-coordinating
committee that released the 2007 NSPDSC publication (Gregory, ―Public Diplomacy and
National Security‖ 2). It served as an umbrella national strategic plan to be implemented in all
government agencies. During the Bush Administration, the NSPDSC was implemented by the
Department of Defense. Upon publication of this document in June 2007, Hughes presented it at
a Department of Defense Conference. She explained how the document was a product of
extensive research on past efforts, as well as recommendations and ideas about American public
diplomacy. The plan contained three main communication strategies:
Our first strategic imperative is that America must offer people across the world a
positive vision of hope that is rooted in our deepest values, our belief in liberty, in
justice, in opportunity.
Our second strategic imperative is to isolate and marginalize the violent extremists and
4

The full report by the GAO can be found at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09679sp.pdf with details on why the
2007 NSPDSC was not effective and gives recommendations for the forthcoming strategic communication plan.
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undermine their efforts to try to appropriate religion to their cause. We must remind
people that America and the West are not in conflict with any religion, but are open
to all religions, and people of all faiths worship freely in America.
The third imperative, and this one sounds kind of simple – comes from a beloved former
ambassador named Frank Wisner, who told me that especially at a time of war and
common threats, that it is very important that America actively nurture and foster
common interests and common values between Americans and people of different
countries and cultures and faiths across the world (Hughes ―Strategic Communication‖).

The communication strategies outlined by Hughes at the Department of Defense
Conference illustrate the NSPDSC‘s principle goals and major rhetorical themes that will be
analyzed in detail in Chapter 3. In this statement, Hughes emphasizes the opportunities the U.S.
can provide for a better life, our desire to work with all people in fighting extremists and how
America must continue to nurture commonalities that all human beings share. These key
components are important because they focus on democratic values, constructing the enemy as a
threat to humanity and the promotion of common interests/values. These themes reveal
themselves repeatedly both in the NSPDSC and in American public diplomacy history. This
speech serves as a telling example of the various rhetorical choices I will analyze within the
following chapters.
A rhetorical analysis of the 2007 NSPDSC helps show how the U.S. has sought to
implement a standard across all sectors of government and contributes to public diplomacy
scholarship by revealing how our government continues to use recurring rhetoric, teaching us
about our past and important as we create new rhetoric. Understanding and analyzing past
rhetorical choices is necessary in order to leave problematic strategies behind and embrace new
ways of communicating. In conducting a close rhetorical reading of the 2007 NSPDSC, I will
show how the document reveals our nation‘s continued reliance of similar rhetorical appeals to
foreign audiences. Although created under the Bush Administration, a more nuanced and in-
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depth analysis of this text warrants attention because it is a historical public diplomacy document
which will be used to inform the forthcoming strategy (―U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues‖
GAO report).
The 2007 NSPDSC is a combination of recommendations and mandatory communicative
actions each government agency was to use in developing departmental communication
strategies. The 2007 NSPDSC is important because it is the first national strategic
communication plan of its kind designed to be implemented in all government agencies. The
2007 NSPDSC is a response to crisis, and shows how we again have seen an extensive
resurgence in American public diplomacy since September 11, 2001. Therefore, it is vital to
examine the rhetorical workings within this important government document that will greatly
shape our future diplomatic efforts.
To demonstrate this recurring pattern of rhetoric in U.S. public diplomacy history, I will
first give a brief historical overview of the use of public diplomacy since the founding of our
nation. Next, I will use a Carter document to argue how it serves as one of many examples of
similar rhetorical strategies used in the 2007 NSPDSC, which exemplifies current rhetorical
strategies in American public diplomacy along with an increase in the iterative appeals our
nation has used since its founding.
In order to argue these claims, I will first review the substantial lack of rhetorical
analysis/frameworks in post 9/11 conversations and scholarship on public diplomacy. I will also
propose that public diplomacy be studied through a rhetorical framework while acknowledging
the importance of the 2007 NSPDSC as a significant historical piece of rhetoric. Next, I will
detail how public diplomacy is understood, then describe American public diplomacy efforts
since 9/11. By detailing past efforts by former Under Secretaries of Public Diplomacy and Public
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Affairs, I will contextualize the relevance of this office‘s activities, explain how approaches to
public diplomacy continue to evolve, and discuss why the expectations for 2007 NSPDSC were
high following former public diplomacy efforts. Finally, I will show how a close rhetorical
reading of the 2007 NSPDSC will illuminate a recurring process in American public diplomacy
of how we define the enemy and appeal to our desired allies through various rhetorical tactics.
Rhetoric and Post 9/11 Public Diplomacy
The recent trend in American public diplomacy research is to primarily evaluate its
success. Few look at how we rhetorically conceptualize or ―sell‖ ourselves. Our discipline can
make significant contributions to the field of public diplomacy by not only analyzing public
relations and media campaigns but also in examining discourse and rhetoric. Analyzing
American rhetoric is important because how we envision and construct the public image can
greatly affect either the success or failure when building relationships with other nations. Craig
Hayden of the University of Southern California‘s Institute for Public Diplomacy has embarked
upon discourse analysis within recent American foreign policy rhetoric. He explores foreign
policy rhetoric as ―imaginary‖ with ―inconsistencies, strategies of mystification, and discursive
world-building‖ (Hayden 2-3). Comparing past Cold War discourse with current foreign policy
arguments, he argues that previous discourse were more successful than contemporary
argumentation (Hayden 32). His analysis finds that ―American values are conflated as universal
truth,‖ therefore concluding that the focus of public diplomacy has been about the ―battle of
ideas,‖ which has become overwhelmingly important in current public diplomacy (Hayden 32).
Another scholar who discusses the use of discursive/rhetorical norms within public
diplomacy is Bruce Gregory, director of the Public Diplomacy Institute at George Washington
University. He briefly explains that discourse surrounding public diplomacy efforts can be
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problematic, and it is difficult to avoid implementing your own ideologies and norms in other
cultures (Gregory, ―Discourse Norms‖ 11). He contends that public diplomacy cannot always
escape discursive reasoning because discourse is rooted in power that influences the
interconnected parts of ―tone, style, doctrines, perceptions, budgets, time horizons, and
organizational structures‖ (Gregory, ―Discourse Norms‖ 13-14). The very nature of public
diplomacy is laden with specific values and interests. Gregory continues to analyze these
possible problems but concludes strategic communication is necessary in diplomatic efforts but
not without ―firewalls‖ to avoid ―covert and coercive instruments of statecraft‖ (Gregory,
―Discourse Norms‖ 15). The nature of how we communicate and make rhetorical choices can
greatly influence our effectiveness. These choices are important because the ways in which we
communicate impact how we are perceived by foreign nations. In order to foster the relationships
that we are seeking, it is absolutely essential that we not dismiss the role of communication in
public diplomacy.
Similarly, Mathew Gerber argues that approaching public diplomacy from a
communications perspective would be extremely beneficial, and how public diplomacy has
ignored the importance of the communication field, which is unfortunate because many have
tried to contribute to it in the past (120). He states that ―public diplomacy is, at its core, a
necessarily suasive endeavor;‖ therefore, it is necessary that we analyze public diplomacy within
the communication field (123). Not only does Gerber argue that public diplomacy be approached
from a communications perspective, but he proposes that it would be even more beneficial to
think of public diplomacy as a rhetorical genre (121). He asserts that ―rhetorical approaches to
the study of public diplomacy are the most appropriate‖ because the fundamental elements of
public diplomacy discourse are ―suasive‖ with the goal to convince audiences of a particular
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viewpoint (Gerber 130). In examining public diplomacy from a generic approach, he believes
will ―enrich the study of public diplomacy and its sub-genres, particularly from the academic
lens of communication studies‖ (Gerber 130). Although few have argued for public diplomacy to
be seen as a rhetorical genre, other communication scholars believe the field of communication
has much to contribute to public diplomacy. Vidhi Chaudhri and Jeremy Fyke, for instance,
argue that many past efforts examine rhetoric in political communication and foreign policy, but
few look at public diplomacy and rhetoric (Chaudhri and Fyke 5). Although more
communication scholarship analyzing public diplomacy is beginning to emerge, there is still a
significant lack of scholarship specifically from a rhetorical perspective.
One book that analyzes current public diplomacy rhetoric and specifically strategic
communication is, Weapons of Mass Persuasion, where the authors examine the use of strategic
communication in the fight against violent extremism (Corman, Trethewey & Godall). They
argue that communication has been ignored and ―all significant diplomatic accomplishments are
rooted in communication strategies‖ (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall ix). They delve into
different failed attempts of strategic communication since the attacks on 9/11, including case
studies of our government‘s use of communication in terrorism and national security. Finally,
they compose a new strategic communication plan. Their analysis includes an evaluation of the
2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication from the
theoretical framework of a strategic communication perspective. The authors state that this
current strategy, like many post 9/11 strategies, needs to be reworked and take on a more
―modern perspective of communication‖ (Corman, Trethewey, & Goodall 168). Their analysis
brings focus to the fact that ―language is crucial in constructing the reality of what the U.S. is
doing and in helping guide others‘ perceptions. Words matter, and to act otherwise misses an
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opportunity for positive persuasion‖ (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 182). Without positive
rhetoric, foreign policy cannot be as effective on its own. We must not dismiss the power of
rhetoric, and it must go hand in hand with policy.
As the scholarship surrounding public diplomacy continues to develop, we are beginning
to recognize the valuable contribution our discipline can make. In the article ―Searching for a
Theory of Public Diplomacy,‖ Eytan Gilboa argues that ―experts and practitioners in public
diplomacy have often ignored relevant information in communication,‖ such as public relations,
branding, media effects, public opinion, rhetoric, and cultural studies which can make numerous
contributions to the contemporary studies of public diplomacy (Gilboa 73-74). As the field of
public diplomacy changes and new theories are developed the ―relevant knowledge in
communication‖ should not be dismissed for it can provide useful in future analyzes (Gilboa 73).
In analyzing public diplomacy rhetoric, it is first necessary to understand the current multifarious
dimensions of public diplomacy.
Understanding Public Diplomacy
The term ―public diplomacy‖ was first coined by Edmund Gullion in 1965 and
characterized as one-way communication that relied heavily on the work of ambassadors
(Tiedeman 10). This traditional view of public diplomacy is often synonymous with propaganda
or psychological warfare, which was reflective of the Cold War (Simpson 11). This view of
public diplomacy can be conceptualized as using ―strategies and tactics designed to achieve the
ideological, political, or military objectives of the sponsoring organization […] through
exploitation of a target audience‘s cultural-psychological attributes and its communication
system‖ (Simpson 11). The difference in the ―new‖ concept of public diplomacy and the
previous one lies in abolishing the use of coercion and exploitation of the target audience in
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reaching one‘s goals. This new concept of public diplomacy is ideally supposed to thrive by
creating trusting and honest relationships through face-to-face communication and active
listening when working to further a country‘s goals.
Although the definition of public diplomacy is widely debated, public diplomacy
described in novice terms is a process ―to understand, inform, engage, and influence foreign
societies-friendly and hostile, and wavering-through a variety of information, culture, education,
and advocacy programs‖ (Smith 117). The process of public diplomacy is how we communicate
and interact with foreign nations to cultivate relationships, whether it is through similar interests,
such as music, knowledge, health, or environmental concerns. Another scholar broadly defines
public diplomacy as an amalgamation of listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and
international broadcasting (Cull, ―Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies‖ 31). American public
diplomacy is grounded in the idea that we will bring peace to the world with freedom and
democracy. The goal for diplomacy is to rely more heavily on ―trust and credibility‖ and ―twoway dialogue‖ by approaching other nations in an honest and truthful manner (Melissan 15).
Whether our efforts are deemed public diplomacy or propaganda, we must acknowledge
that each one of these terms has many things in common. Currently, most scholars and
government officials alike agree that public diplomacy relies primarily on what Joseph Nye has
termed ―soft power,‖ meaning a reliance on attracting the world to a country‘s values and culture
(5-6). This idea of public diplomacy has become popular since 9/11, because there is an
―outpouring of public commentary and criticism of the efforts to revive U.S. public diplomacy
[…as] a significant indicator of broader public concerns about America‘s role in the world‖
(Kennedy and Lucas 321). Following the crisis of 9/11 and our engagement in the Iraq war, the
U.S.‘s image has predominately remained negative despite our continued efforts in countering
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anti-Americanism. Extensive amounts of energy have been invested not only by the U.S.
government in evaluating America‘s role worldwide but also by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and scholars who continue to debate, criticize, and put forth recommendations on how to
engage the world.
Numerous academic and news articles contribute to this analysis. These articles have
drawn attention to the U.S.‘s unsuccessful strategies by tracing previous Cold War efforts and
recommending new tactics to combat an unfavorable image of the U.S. and its engagement
worldwide. Mark Leonard argues that public diplomacy currently lies in the hands of ―Britney
Spears, Amnesty International, a little truth, empathy, and understanding‖ (48). Thus, American
public diplomacy needs to be approached from every possible level including pop culture, NGOs
and improved interpersonal skills. He believes that American public diplomacy needs to be
―about building relationships, starting from understanding other countries‘ needs, cultures, and
peoples and then looking for areas to make common cause‖ (Leonard 50). According to Leonard,
rather than telling others how to live, we must first listen and understand the complexities of a
society‘s culture, or we will only be met by resistance. These criticisms have not been entirely
ignored by those in power, however the U.S.‘s previous attempts to reach others has not been
successful (Lord & Lynch 3-6). To further understand the present concept of public diplomacy, I
will next chronicle the practices of American public diplomacy since the September 11th
terrorist attacks.
The Current Context: Public Diplomacy in the Post 9/11 World
With the rise of worldwide anti-American sentiment since the U.S.‘s war and engagement
in Iraq following 9/11, interest in public diplomacy has grown dramatically in the United States
and has become a focal point of American consciousnesses (Snow & Taylor ix). Again, we see
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how a pivotal historical crisis spawned an overwhelming ―information and propaganda effort not
seen since George Creel‘s Committee laid a foundation for advertising America in wartime‖
during World War I (Snow, Information 53). Our government‘s mobilization efforts in
promoting America‘s image and the use of public diplomacy strategies have become paramount
following the attacks on 9/11 (Snow, Information 53-54). Public diplomacy has expanded
beyond propaganda or psychological warfare to what Jan Melissan characterizes as ―old wine in
new bottles‖ by going through a repackaging and becoming an upgraded product (3). These
changes, prompted by the aftermath of 9/11, resulted in a transformation of requirements for
public diplomacy by the U.S. government (Melissan 5).
After 9/11, our government realized the necessity of public diplomacy and implemented
many new offices and positions. This resulted in public diplomacy involving an even broader
spectrum of communication channels, which manifested in broadcast, film, music, NGOs,
corporations, agencies, individuals, radio broadcast, Internet, and exchange programs. Many of
these efforts were put in place by the newly developed position and office within the State
Department of Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
Although the Under Secretary position was developed under President Clinton in 1999
following the dissolution of the United States Information Agency in 1998, the position did not
enter the public eye until the events of 9/11 (―Under Secretary,‖ Serving History). Charlotte
Beers, while not the first Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, became a
highly publicized and central component to the present state of American public diplomacy.
Beers emerged during the Bush Administration as the solution to ―selling the American brand‖
and combating anti-Americanism (Snow, Information 84-85). Well known for her ability to
brand anything from KFC, IBM, and from Uncle Ben to Jaguar, the executive branch thought the
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she would be an ideal candidate for taking on the task of branding the U.S. (Snow 84). Secretary
of State Colin Powell knew that the U.S. needed a different approach to public diplomacy and
believed Beers was perfect for the job (Snow, Information 84). Powell explained that Beers, as
the new Under Secretary, would work to change the U.S. approach to public diplomacy from the
―old USIA way to really branding foreign policy […] marketing American values to the world
and not just putting out pamphlets‖ (qtd. in Snow, Information 85). This approach to brand
American public diplomacy was different from the past because the focus was to create an
emotional connection with the audience unlike ever before (Snow, Information 84-85). As we
faced a new world with differing technological advances and political challenges this new
approach in how the U.S. communicated with the world was not only needed but welcomed.
On October 2, 2001, Beers was sworn in as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs (Snow, Information 86). Beers stated that her new appointment was ―the most
sophisticated brand assignment I have ever had. It is almost as though we have to redefine what
America is‖ (Tiedeman 39). Beers, being entirely new to the world of international relations, had
absolutely no experience and was completely ignorant of the daunting task upon which she was
embarking (Snow, Information 87). With Beers‘ minimal experience and the undertaking of such
a critical position, it was not surprising that she immediately came under scrutiny. William Drake
from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for instance, stated, ―I just find the notion
that you can sell Uncle Sam like Uncle Ben‘s highly problematic‖ (Fullerton & Kendrick 24).
Drake‘s response highlights the difficulty and problems one can encounter in trying to simplify a
nation‘s complexities and sell it like rice. In responding to critics upon her appointment,
Secretary Powell explained how Beers ―got me to buy Uncle Ben‘s Rice, so what‘s wrong with
getting somebody who knows how to sell something? We are selling a product. We need
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someone who can rebrand American foreign policy [and] rebrand American diplomacy‖
(Fullerton & Kendrick 24). As a nation we needed a more effective approach to public
diplomacy, and Secretary Powell was confident that Beers‘ past experience in the advertising
industry could serve as a more practical approach to combat the plummeting public opinion of
American foreign policy in the world. Although the idea of selling foreign policy or a country‘s
image is nothing new in the history of America, it is precarious to assume a country‘s foreign
policies will always be perceived in a credible and non-hegemonic manner when promoted this
way.
Beers quickly got to work in crafting persuasive ways to ―sell‖ America. However, many
of her efforts resembled former Cold War tactics. For example, one of the first programs
implemented, Rewards for Justice, was composed of a series of public service announcements
(PSAs) to help the U.S. fight terrorism. Based on the 2001 Patriot Act, authorization was given
to the Secretary of State to offer up to $25 million in rewards to finding terrorists (Powell). This
same program, first implemented by President Reagan in 1984, had paid over $7 million to
twenty-two different informants before 9/11 (Snow, Information 91). The PSAs were published
in the form of radio announcements, posters, and leaflets (Fullerton & Kendrick 81). The most
familiar of these announcements was the radio spot used in an interview by Diane Sawyer with
Under Secretary Beers. The announcement stated the following: ―Do you know a terrorist? […]
The United States government is offering rewards of up to $25 million for information that
prevents an international terrorist act against U.S. persons or property or brings to justice persons
who have committed one‖ (Fullerton & Kendrick 85). This PSA encourages audiences not only
to assume a greater fear against extremists but reiterates that terrorists are everywhere and you
may have the power to stop them.
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The call for informants in the fight against terrorism continued as Beers worked to create
a booklet entitled The Network of Terrorism. Printed in thirty-six languages, the booklet told the
story of all known terrorist groups worldwide and became the most extensively distributed
diplomacy pamphlet in U.S. State Department history (Fullerton & Kendrick 87). Beers also
worked to put together an anthology of American writers, entitled Writers on America, and
strongly encouraged more international exchange (Fullerton & Kendrick 88-89). These examples
are important because they show that despite Secretary Powell‘s goal for Beers to rebrand
America and reinvent public diplomacy, these tactics are further evidence of how we rely on
strategies from the past. Like these other efforts to rebrand American public diplomacy the
revamping of Voice of America Arabic is one lasting Beers‘ effort that also reveals similarities
to the past.
Beers initiated the re-branding of former Voice of America Arabic into what is now
known as Radio Sawa, a radio station founded by the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the
U.S. Congress (Tiedman 43). It first began March 23, 2002, as an FM station broadcast from
Washington D.C. and Dubai. The goal was to reach the young Arab population with news
programs and contemporary American and Middle Eastern music (―About Us,‖ Radio Sawa).
Young Arabs were a major percentage of the target audience because they could have a
significant influence on forthcoming U.S. foreign policy and how the Middle East perceives the
U.S. (el-Nawawy 185-6). The concept of Radio Sawa was thought to be a more attractive,
―hipper‖ way to reach the target audience. The rebranding effort aimed to join the Arab World
and United States thus named ―Sawa,‖ the Arabic translation for ―together‖ (el-Nawawy 189).
Before Radio Sawa‘s March 2002 launch, Congress granted them $35 million (Fullerton &
Kendrick 96). Although the concept of Radio Sawa was conceived before 9/11, it was not
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launched until after the attacks because the importance of influencing public perception in the
Middle East was not seen as vital until then (Tomlinson). The revamping of Voice of America
Arabic into Radio Sawa was a concerted effort to positively influence the Middle East.
The content of Radio Sawa differs from the former Voice of America Arabic because
there is little focus on news and the primary draw is popular music. One of the members of the
Broadcasting Board of Governors argued ―the way to win hearts and minds in the Middle East is
to appeal to young people‖ (Fullerton & Kendrick 97). A 2004 Nielsen poll showed it leading in
Middle East international broadcasting with an average 38 percent of fifteen years or older
listening weekly (Fullerton & Kendrick 97). The opposing argument, however, is that the
previous format of VOA Arabic was more beneficial. The numbers have shown that despite this
criticism, Radio Sawa is attracting many listeners. However, a recent study by communication
scholar Mohammed el-Nawawy found that young Arab students‘ perception of ―Radio Sawa‘s
credibility was not correlated with how frequently they listened to its programming news‖ (200).
He also found that, ―attitudes towards U.S. foreign policy have worsened slightly since their
exposure to Radio Sawa‖ and the U.S. funded television station, Al-Hurra (el-Nawawy 201).
This study reveals that despite the popularity of Radio Sawa among young Arabs, the station is
used solely for entertainment purposes rather than as a news source. Instead, young Arab
students trust Arab networks for news. Despite such studies, broadcasting continues to expand
and is one of the biggest components in American public diplomacy.
The focus on State Department broadcasting continues to grow. Fifty percent of public
diplomacy funding in 2004 went towards broadcasting (Galal 4). One of the largest broadcast
public diplomacy campaigns, called the ―Shared Values Initiative,‖ was during Beers‘ tenure as
Under Secretary. The campaign was deemed a failure by academics, media outlets, government
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officials and advertisers (Fullerton and Kendrick 101). However, both Powell and Beers
continued to claim the initiative served its purpose (Fullerton and Kendrick 121, 130). The
―Shared Values Initiative‖ primary format was broadcast but also included other
multidimensional efforts. The content of the initiative was based on a RoperASW Worldwide
tool for research called ValueScope. This research worked to identify ―core belief systems based
on personal values‖ throughout the world and suggested similar values of faith, family, and
learning existed between the Muslim world and the U.S. (Fullerton & Kendrick 27). Based on
this research, Beers decided to focus on religious tolerance. Because of the possible problematic
nature of the U.S. State Department sponsoring such an initiative, Malik Hassan, a Muslim
medical executive, helped create the nonprofit group The Council of American Muslims for
Understanding (CAMU) to sell the campaign (Fullerton & Kendrick 30). There was a concern
the campaign would be perceived as propaganda if sponsored by the U.S. government, so
CAMU promoted the campaign, but the U.S. government paid for it.
The campaign had a religious focus with the goal of sending the message that Americans
are fighting a War on Terrorism, not Muslims. The initiative also included diplomatic speeches,
newspaper ads, internet sites, and a magazine entitled Muslim Life in America (Fullerton &
Kendrick 31; Alsultany 611). The commercials were the most important part of the initiative
which focused on a baker, doctor, school teacher, journalist, and New York City firefighter
(Fullerton & Kendrick 33). Each segment contained the same few elements: a positive
testimonial about life in America and people‘s active practice of their religion emphasizing
Americans‘ tolerance for the Muslim faith (Alsultany 611). The firefighter, Farooq Muhammed,
epitomizes the campaign when he states, ―I‘ve never gotten disrespected because I‘m a Muslim
[…] we‘re all brothers and sisters. Here I am as one human, taking care of another‖ (qtd. in
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Plaisance 259-260). The story of this individual is noteworthy because it is an example of
creating rhetorical identification, which I will argue is one of the recurring practices in American
public diplomacy.
Once it aired, the ―Shared Values Campaign‖ was poorly received, and the State
Department quickly pulled it (Fullerton & Kendrick 36). The reasons for discontinuing the ad
campaign were never entirely clear, although Patrick Lee Plaisance‘s analysis of the ―Shared
Values Campaign‖ determined that it represented a form of propaganda with numerous problems
(250). Professor Christopher Simpson stated, ―The central illusion here is that the U.S. is
somehow not getting its message across; the large majority of people in the Middle East
understand pretty well what the United States is actually saying and doing, and no amount of
propaganda is really going to change that‖ (qtd. in Plaisance 266). The campaign was seen as
deceptive, which not only misrepresented the experience of America Muslims, but also misled
people regarding the actions of the U.S.
There were extensive negative reactions to this campaign from the international and
national media, academia, diplomats, the advertising community, and the U.S. government. The
reaction to the ―Shared Values Campaign‖ is perhaps best expressed by Youssef Ibrahim of the
Council on Foreign Relations: ―It was like this was the 1930s and the government was running
commercials showing happy blacks in America‖ (qtd. in Snow, Information 102). Instead of
communicating American policies that would lead to greater interaction and dialogue with
Muslims, this quote exemplifies how the campaign‘s priority was to portray American Muslims
as happy and satisfied. It was no surprise to find the campaign was unsuccessful in curbing antiAmerican sentiment, especially when a Zogby opinion poll in eight Muslim countries showed a
rise in Anti-Americanism (Snow, Information 103). Beers, however, refused to admit failure.

21
She defended the campaign, stating to CNN that the goal was to start a dialogue and that was
exactly what it did (Fullerton & Kendrick 38). The problem was that the ―dialogue,‖ festering in
the Muslim world became more detrimental than helpful to the U.S. image. Despite the effort to
sway public opinion in the Muslim world, we lacked the proper technique ―in changing the
attitudes of the public‖ (Bernays 958). In response to the campaign, Beers stated, ―The more
negative the response from the underground powers in the Muslim world, the more effective the
campaign‖ (Fullerton & Kendrick 38). In spite of her attempt to reach extremist groups and open
up dialogue, her campaign, instead, contributed to the U.S. losing support from allies and left
minimal room for positive relationship building or communication.
Although Beers had additional plans for similar campaigns, her tenure ended just
seventeen months after it began (Edelstein & Krebs 90). Unlike her supporters, the State
Department sided more closely with the mass media and anonymously provided fodder for
criticism. There were numerous claims by unnamed U.S. officials who felt her appointment was
laughable; others charged that she was ―failing‖ and nothing she did actually worked (Fullerton
& Kendrick 117). This criticism all happened behind closed doors and when her appointment
ended, several Members of Congress lauded her work. Secretary of State Colin Powell was
especially proud of Beers, stating she possessed ―incredible expertise‖ (Fullerton & Kendrick
117). Beers‘ tenure as Under Secretary had been enormously public and not surprisingly
Secretary Powell and Members of Congress complimented her to ensure the future credibility of
the new position.
The failure of the ―Shared Values Campaign‖ was repeatedly claimed to be a result of not
understanding our target audience and anti-American sentiment continued to grow following the
campaign (Snow, Information 105). The Pew Research Center found that the image of the U.S.
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fell drastically from 2002 to 2006 (Corman, Treathway & Goodall 28). This campaign effort is
relevant because Beers‘ tenure as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was
influential to the future of the position and contextualizes how dire public diplomacy had
become.
Following the problematic ―Shared Values Campaign‖ and declining U.S. image,
Congress decided to put together a panel to investigate why the U.S. had such a poor image in
the world (Fullerton & Kendrick 118). This was a bipartisan panel, chaired by former United
States Ambassador to Syria and Israel Edward P. Djerejian. This panel eventually released the
report ―Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy
in the Arab and Muslim World,‖ also known as the ―Djerejian Report‖ (Fullerton & Kendrick
118). This report provided the following recommendations: the creation of a White House
Director of Public Diplomacy, an increase in scholarships/fellowships, and an evaluation of the
―Shared Values Campaign.‖ It concluded that a need existed for advertising in public diplomacy
(Fullerton & Kendrick 118). Further engagement in all government sectors was deemed
necessary and the problem with the ―Shared Values Campaign‖ was not that advertising could
not be effective but we needed to find the best form and way to use advertising.
As the U.S. continued to use advertising throughout public diplomacy; however, our
efforts proved ineffective. A 2003 report showed that the U.S. was spending close to $600
million to win over the world, but our image continued to decline globally (Edelstein & Krebs
90). With the War in Iraq, our numbers continued to fall, not only in the Middle East but in other
nations, such as France, Germany, and Britain (Edelstein & Krebs 90).
Despite the bleak outlook, in 2004 the U.S. decided to launch the television station AlHurra. Al-Hurra, meaning ―Free One,‖ which operates from the nonprofit Middle East
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Television Network but is funded and run by the Broadcasting Board of Governors and U.S.
Congress (Lynch 106). An initial budget of $62 million was granted to Al-Hurra with the goal of
providing an alternative to the very popular Al-Jezeera network (Lynch 101-106). Al-Hurra
follows the same framework of CNN with twenty-four hours news and is broadcast to twentytwo countries in the Arab World (PBS Online Newshour). Al-Hurra seeks to counter any kind of
anti-American news with ―accurate, balanced, and comprehensive news‖ reporting (―About Us,‖
Al-Hurra). The station has been regarded with much cynicism regionally and continues to be
seen as propaganda (Lynch 104-105). Ambassador William Rugh explains that ―these efforts
have been a disaster, in terms of reaching appropriate audience sizes, and more importantly, in
influencing attitudes‖ (qtd. in Svet 21). Another scholar, when analyzing Al-Hurra, explained the
market difficulty and how Al-Hurra could possibly turn into a fiasco (Lynch 102). Al-Hurra also
lacks a specific audience and the news coverage continues to be limited compared to its
counterparts and fails to join any Arab conversations (Lynch 103-104). Although Al-Hurra is
another possible means to reach the Arab world, it has yet to prove itself effective.
Al-Hurra had done little to impact our image and a 2004 poll by Zogby International
reported that negative attitudes towards the U.S. were 98 percent in Egypt and 94 percent in
Saudi Arabia. Terms that were associated with the U.S. included ―unfair foreign policy,
imperialistic, and oil interest‖ (Svet 11). Despite the fact these polls clearly show what is most
disliked about the U.S., the strategies implemented have not addressed these opinions. The office
of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was successful in its initiatives
or campaigns post-9/11 and needed a better strategy to address the negative perceptions of the
U.S. worldwide. At this time, the scene was perfectly set for the forthcoming Under Secretary of
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. Many were frustrated that public diplomacy
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efforts had little funding, success, guidance or staff. Karen Hughes, a former Bush staffer,
arrived to implement a more successful strategy than her predecessors (Edelstein & Krebs 91).
Karen Hughes, deemed one of the most powerful women working for President Bush,
was chosen to be the next Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy. She was known for selling
messages and worked on the White House Iraq Group whose sole goal was to sell the Iraq War
to the American people (―Karen‖). The appointment of Hughes was intended to counter many of
Beers‘ efforts; however, her choices followed many of Beers‘ same principles. Hughes,
previously a very successful political campaign manager, relied heavily on advertising and fell
victim to the same problematic assumptions as Beers (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 11).
Despite the fact that Hughes emphasized the importance of listening and conducted a ―listening
tour‖ to learn about other cultures, this became another outlet to send our most important
message of democracy, freedom, and religious pluralism (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 11).
The ―listening tour‖ did not receive a warm response, and frustration erupted against our
―selling‖ the American way of life (Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 12). The U.S. image
continued to fall, and a 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project stated, ―America‘s global image has
again slipped and support for the war on terrorism has declined even among close U.S. allies‖
(Corman, Tretheway & Goodall 28). The situation continued to look grim and a new
communication strategy was still needed. In response to this uncertainty, Karen Hughes, in
collaboration with the Policy Coordinating Committee, created the influential 2007 publication
The U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC). The
plan was for the NSPDSC to be coordinated at all agency levels and to disseminate a coherent
message at all levels of the U.S. government. Although the NSPDSC was not fully implemented
it still proves to be an influential and historical document in American public diplomacy.
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The NSPDSC was composed as the U.S. faced growing political challenges and the goal
for this communication strategy was to help counter the negative image that had developed
during U.S.‘s engagement in Iraq. Following 9/11, President Bush began a war under the false
assumption that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that were an eminent threat to
American security (Galbraith 1-2). As the war progressed into a more intensified endeavor for
the U.S. in our search for WMD‘s and efforts to implement democracy into Iraq, a disconnect
existed between our policies and rhetoric (Zaharna 3). Instead of the U.S. bringing peace and
democracy to Iraq, the result was the Iranian militia returned to Iraq (Galbraith 21). Thus with
the U.S. presence in Iraq, tensions between Sunnis and Shiites escalated leading to a civil war
that allowed Iran to strengthen its power in Iraq but in the world (2, 17, 26). Despite the U.S.‘s
claim that Iran was an of the ―Axis of Evil,‖ Galbraith details that no diplomatic, military or
other efforts were used in order to counter the power Iran was gaining in Iraq (3). Ultimately,
U.S. policies in Iraq consequentially helped Iran become a greater nuclear threat worldwide
(Galbraith 2-3). This political context surrounding the creation of the NSPDSC not only helps
one better understand the strategy but shows how no concordance existed both between
American policy and rhetoric with Iraq or Iran.
Understanding the historical context of American public diplomacy following 9/11and
prior to the NSPDSC is useful because it allows us to comprehend ―new‖ concepts of public
diplomacy and new offices/positions that have been established within the government. With
public diplomacy‘s growing importance in the U.S., discussing the various initiatives we have
engaged in the last nine years is necessary because it illustrates how we continue to remake
history regardless of various technological, political, financial, or cultural changes.
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METHODLOGY
This thesis focuses on an example of American public diplomacy and provides an
examination of the present public diplomacy rhetoric through the textual analysis of the 2007
U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC). The
methodology for this thesis is two-fold. I analyze how this publication is an important piece of
historical rhetoric with similarities to past American public diplomacy initiatives which provides
a historical context for the NSPDSC. I rely on historical criticism because it reveals that the
present is not unlike the past and illuminates how certain strategic rhetorical choices were made.
Not only does this analysis exemplify our continued iterations of public diplomacy throughout
history, but also shows how we approach those whom we deem as the enemy or threat.
It is important to look at this strategy in the historical context of American public
diplomacy because it not only tells us about our past, but it reveals a more in-depth perspective
on the context of public diplomacy today. A message or strategy is ―fundamental to an
appreciation of the entire event‖ therefore; we must look at the message within its historical
context (Rosenfield 58). By looking at the message within its historical context, we can then
reveal how such ―works were produced, showing how the messages are themselves a reflection
of their era‖ (Rosenfield 60). Analyzing this text within its historical context will show that
―ideas are not here treated as entities, which enjoy an independent existence‖ rather they are a
―product‖ of a particular environment, created from many different aspects of a historical
context, therefore serving a purpose for society during that specific moment in time (Wrage 29).
Ideas of a time are affected by various ―exigencies‖ within a particular context that allow us to
―gain insight into the life of an era‖ and to ―observe the reflections of prevailing social ideas and
attitudes‖ (Wrage 33).This is useful in understanding why certain rhetorical strategies were
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chosen for ―ideas are framed in a context of rhetorical necessities and possibilities‖ (Wrage 33).
For the historical context will influence particular rhetorical responses of that time.
An analysis of the NSPDSC through a historical approach will reveal that ―rhetoric of
public address does not exist for its own sake‖ (Wrage 31). Analyzing this text through this lens
is helpful in explaining the ―essence‖ of a message that is crafted with the goal of changing one‘s
mindset and forming new persuasions (Wrage 31). By looking at the text within both the current
and historical context of public diplomacy, we can better understand what is going on
rhetorically during this context and how individuals choose to persuade an audience. We can also
evaluate whether the messages were successful (Zarefsky 31-32). This vantage point gives
meaning to ―persuasive discourse‖ in its particular historical context (Ball 63). This form of
analysis is useful for it provides an alternative to ―see rhetoric as a perpetual and dynamic
process of social construction, maintenance, and change rather than an isolated, static product‖
(Turner 4). Therefore, we can understand current public diplomacy rhetoric, not as an insulated
manifestation of the times, but rather as an interconnected piece of rhetoric that has existed since
the founding of our country. The NSPDSC publication warrants attention for it is an example of
a very important recurring process in American history.
After showing how the NSPDSC serves as historical rhetoric, I will analyze the text using
Kenneth Burke‘s concept of identification and the components of ethos and enemy construction
within identification. Burke describes identification as ―A is not identical with his colleague B,‖
but if they have similar interests ―A is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even
when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so‖
(Rhetoric of Motives 20). However, this does not mean that you lose your individuality, rather
you are ―both joined and separate‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 21). Identification takes place
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when people identified through a common interest or ―substance,‖ but that does not mean they
lose their ―distinctness‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 21). A group of people is created through
identification and joined around some ―common substance of meaning‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of
Motives 23). This ―substance‖ can be something as small as people who like pets to a political
reason to go to war.
Following 9/11, identification became pervasive because it was the way in which we
―confront the implications of division‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 22). It became clear that
America was divided from our attackers, and we began to see people join together on the
common substance of fighting the terrorists. It is not uncommon to see a rhetorical resurgence of
identification during such crises like the attacks of 9/11, for ―identification is compensatory to
division‖ and allows us to identify the evil enemy (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 22). For
identification to exist there must be division; they require one another. Burke further explains the
reason for rhetorical identification exists because humans can never completely share the same
common substances, and there will always be something which divides them (Rhetoric of
Motives 25). It is because of this inability to completely identify with one another that we need
rhetoric. The emphasis on identification in America‘s fight on terrorism stems from the problem
that ―individuals are at odds with one another‖ and without division no need would exist ―to
proclaim their unity‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 22). Following 9/11, it became
overwhelmingly obvious that an organization of individuals existed with distinct divisions from
us. As we continue our fight against terrorism, the process of identification becomes even more
salient not only at the executive level of government but everywhere.
The process of identification inevitably relies upon ethos to create common ground and to
rhetorically define and unite an audience against the shared enemy (Cheney 148). To further
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explore the Burkean use of identification in the text, I will look at it in conjunction with ethos
and enemy construction which reveals not only how we currently engage with the world, but also
is telling of our past and forthcoming strategies. By looking at these concepts of ethos and enemy
construction I show how the U.S.‘s use of these rhetorical choices are foundational to American
public diplomacy and will likely continue to reoccur in U.S. efforts for years to come.
In conducting my analysis, I will analyze this rhetorical process of identification within
the text. I will first look at the use of ethos throughout the NSPDSC document and analyze how
ethos is salient in trying to create a common ground around shared values, threats, and interests
with the audience. Ethos is an important part of the process of identification for it is related to the
ways rhetoric can persuade one to identify with something. Burke refers to the importance of
Aristotle‘s concept of ethos in A Rhetoric of Motives stating, ―You persuade a man only insofar
as you talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your
ways with his [and] the identifying of himself with his audience will be more effective if it is
genuine‖ (55-56). In order for the rhetor to persuade its audience in identification these
characteristics must be highlighted which further enhance the rhetors credibility and goodwill.
Finally I draw attention to how the text rhetorically ―constructs‖ the enemy as the other
while maintaining identity and unity (Edelman 87). And how the ‗other‘ is further constructed as
an ―extreme threat to freedom and civilization‖ (Ivie, Democracy 46). I analyze how the text
rhetorically defines the enemy and how the other becomes representative of ―demons that
savagely massacre innocent people and thereby threaten to destroy all of civilization‖ (Ivie,
Democracy 135). For, the enemy is characterized as the greatest threat to all humanity with no
regard for religion or nationality who seeks to bring violence to the world.
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Chapter Preview
Chapter Two will look at the recurring historical process by giving an overview of how
public diplomacy has existed since the founding of our country and how we have always sought
to create commonalities with other nations. I will then give a historical overview of public
diplomacy since the founding of our nation and draw attention to choices that show similarities
with today‘s tactics. Then I will show how the NSPDSC is illustrative of a current historical
context and how as a nation in the face of crisis, we iterate similar strategies. Finally, to further
exemplify this recurring historical process I will look at the Carter Administration‘s plan which
was put forth during the Iranian hostage crisis. By closely examining the context surrounding the
Carter Administration‘s document, I will show how this is a comparative example of our
recurring acts in public diplomacy.
Chapter Three will look at how the NSPDSC acts rhetorically. I will analyze how the text
conceives our target, the Middle East, and how the text works to create identification with the
audience. I will analyze three rhetorical strategies within the text; use of ethos, construction of
the enemy, and the process of identification and how all of these work in tandem with one
another.
Chapter Four will explore some of the problems/shortcomings with these rhetorical
tactics in public diplomacy. I will conclude by reiterating the importance of this scholarship not
only in our current context but in the future.
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Chapter 2:
A Brief History of American Public Diplomacy from Our Founding
to the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis
Let facts be submitted to a candid world. -Declaration of Independence, 1776

Since the founding of our nation, public diplomacy has played a significant role in
influencing the nature of our relationships with other nations. The Continental Congress,
Benjamin Franklin, President George Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), John F.
Kennedy (JFK), Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Harry Truman, and many other presidential
administrations all employed public diplomacy (Waller, The American Way 1, 19; Galal 2). The
first letters of the 1774 Continental Congress provide examples of how we have always sought to
create identification rhetorically through common values and ideals while clearly defining and
attacking the enemy (Waller, The Public 40). The founding document of the United States, The
Declaration of Independence, also shows the use of this rhetoric in our country‘s public
diplomacy. The Declaration not only was significant for the colonies, but it also served as a
―manifesto‖ in appealing to worldwide opinion and support for the American colonies during
separation from British rule (Waller, The Public 93).
In this chapter, I suggest that the rhetoric of American public diplomacy is part of a
recurring rhetorical process that has existed since the inception of our country and impacts the
social reality of various historical contexts (Turner 2). I examine how public diplomacy has been
an important American practice since the founding of our nation and an enduring process that
continues to rely on many consistent rhetorical appeals or ―symbols and systems of symbols [to
influence] beliefs, values, attitudes, and action‖ despite changing contexts (qtd. in Turner 2).
Public diplomacy serves as a ―product of social environment, as arising from many levels
of life, and as possessing social utility‖ (Wrage 29). Therefore, the idea of public diplomacy
depends upon the political context and is never independent, because it is ―framed in the context
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of rhetorical necessities and possibilities‖ (Wrage 29, 33). A historical overview of public
diplomacy since the founding of our nation through the First and Second World Wars and the
Cold War further reveals our perpetual use of rhetoric that creates identification by promoting
common values and interests which are manifested within changing historical contexts during
national and worldwide crises.
By surveying different periods in U.S. history, we can see the importance and reasons for
crafting varying kinds of public diplomacy rhetoric. Analyzing this iterative rhetorical process in
history allows us to better understand how public diplomacy has ―enabled, enacted, empowered,
and constrained the central concerns of history: human action and reaction‖ (Turner 8). Such
analyses let us contextualize current public diplomacy while understanding how the rhetorical
choices made today are influenced by the past. Public diplomacy rhetoric can be explained as
―part of an ongoing historical conversation that is rooted in the past, has meaning in the present,
and has implications for the future‖ (Ball 62). Looking at the history of public diplomacy and
―the study of tried-and-true methods from the Twentieth Century will help practitioners avoid
unnecessarily re-inventing through trial and error, and will provide historical precedents‖
(Waller, The Public 20). We must understand the ―perpetual and dynamic process‖ of the history
of public diplomacy, because it ―is constituted through communication. Thus, when we deny
history, we deny ourselves.‖ By ignoring rhetorical history we miss the opportunity to learn
about our past choices that can help us anticipate our future (Turner 4; Ball 62).
As I will show in the historical overview, the use of public diplomacy rhetoric has always
shown itself during times of national stress. As Cull suggests, the United States ―since its birth,
in time of crisis [has] sought to present its image to the world‖ (The Cold War 1). In the history
of the United States, crises have continually provided environmental contexts where rhetoric is
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elicited in response. Rhetorical constructions have been used to persuade foreign audiences to
identify with our crisis and restore a favorable image of the U.S. to the world. An examination of
American crises and our responses to foreign publics through varying public diplomacy tactics
allows us to see rhetorical similarities during each context and understand that these crises
subsequent responses are not completely independent from one another. Instead, they are
historically interconnected.
To further support my argument, I will show that a reading of the Carter Administration‘s
communication plan crafted following the Iranian Hostage Crisis serves as a rhetorical artifact
that exemplifies the unchanging rhetorical process the U.S. continues to use in public diplomacy.
I will analyze the communication plan by first contextualizing the crisis then drawing attention to
the rhetorical choices in creating identification, constructing enemies, and enhancing ethos. As I
will show in Chapter 3 with my analysis of the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, these rhetorical strategies demonstrate that our nation
continues to rely on much of the same rhetoric in the face of crisis.
An American Convention
Public diplomacy has long been a part of American diplomatic practice and was used
during the establishment of our country (Waller, The Public 40). In the fight for American
independence, not only was public diplomacy used to create a greater bond with foreign publics
over a common enemy, but it was also used to emphasize similar values and ideas (Waller, ―The
American‖ 3). The Continental Congress first employed public diplomacy in 1774 by making
public appeals to Canada, Jamaica, Bermuda, and Britain in its quest for support of the American
colonies (Waller, The Public 40; Taylor 134). Samuel Adams, John Hancock, Benjamin
Franklin, and George Washington were all influential in the initial rhetorical pleas for support of
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the American colonies (Taylor 134). These initial appeals led to writing The Declaration of
Independence in 1776 (Waller, The Public 93). The founders intended for this document not only
to appeal to its domestic audience but also to an international one (Cull, The Cold War 2).
This proclamation is a telling example of public diplomacy at that time, and shows us
how the use of similar rhetorical patterns have been a continuous part of American public
diplomacy. Our nation‘s founding documents reveal our attempts to influence world opinion
through an emphasis on the value and interest of ideas (Waller, The Public 100). The United
States was created from ideas that needed promoting and support to sustain them (Cull, The Cold
War 1). John Adams expressed this sentiment best when he said that the American Revolution
was a ―struggle for the hearts and minds of the people‖ (qtd. in Taylor 142). Similarly, Thomas
Jefferson engaged in this struggle by working to promote the ideas surrounding the establishment
of the American democratic republic (Ardnt 15). Jefferson also worked to rally support for the
American colonies, claiming that the Declaration of Independence was ―motivated by ‗a decent
respect to the opinions of mankind‘‖ (Bardos 425). Thomas Paine and Benjamin Franklin both
worked in Paris trying to change what they considered the misperceptions of America and were
also pivotal figures in winning the war of ideas (Cull 1-2). Each of these founders played an
important part in engaging with foreign publics in promoting the fundamental ideas and values of
American independence. During this early period of American history, public diplomacy was
practiced in print and person and seen as an important element of American diplomatic efforts.
As public diplomacy became institutionalized in the U.S. and part of the ―great
battleground of ideas‖ it began to take on other forms (Waller, The Public 100). For example,
during the 19th century, the press was heavily used as a means to rally support not only at home
but in Europe as well (Cull, The Cold War 3-4). Public diplomacy efforts were used during the
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Civil War, most specifically in trying to persuade international opinion to side with the
Confederacy or the Union (Taylor 169). These efforts were often carried out by placing ads and
articles in international papers and by conducting lectures (Cull, The Cold War 2-3). Another
popular tactic in selling the image of the U.S. at this time was the use of the World Fairs,
beginning in London in 1851 with the Great Exhibition (Cull, The Cold War 3).
As the 19th century came to an end, public diplomacy began to reveal itself in more
forms. Our nation ceased trying to persuade the world to support us in domestic issues and the
idea that Americans could take on all the world‘s problems became omnipresent (Cull, The Cold
War 5). This thinking resulted in new strategies of diplomacy to educate and promote American
ideas, such as international exchange. In addition, private organizations were set up at this time
to enhance communication and learning between nations (Cull, The Cold War 5). As the
institutionalizing of American public diplomacy continued, it established itself as a fundamental
doctrine within our society. It wasn‘t until the 20th century, however, that the United States
became heavily immersed in public diplomacy, and we began to see an even greater reliance on
rhetorical appeals.
Reaction to the World Wars and the Increasing Use of Public Diplomacy
The ever-changing political context and challenges of the world during the 20th century
resulted in a remarkable demand for the use of public diplomacy. This political context gave the
U.S. an even greater opportunity to devise broadening uses of rhetorical strategies in persuading
foreign nations. With the beginning of the World War I, the United States government began an
enormous surge of public diplomacy. President Wilson went to work selling the war by creating
the Committee on Public Information (CPI) under the direction of George Creel (Cull, The Cold
War 6). The CPI, although initially created to influence the domestic public, was the first agency

36
to inform foreign publics about U.S. ideology (Hixson 1). The CPI used photographs,
newspapers, films, and foreign journalists to help counter German propaganda (Taylor 184).
Although fairly successful in swaying worldwide opinion, the CPI was shut down in 1919 for
being ―too partisan‖ (Cull, The Cold War 9; Tuch 14). Following the work of the CPI and
through the 1930s, we saw a strong effort to counter German influence through the cultural
diplomacy of private and government implementation of such things as international libraries
and exchange programs (Cull, The Cold War 9-10; Lord, ―The Past‖ 49).
It wasn‘t until World War II that the rhetorical fight between ideas and values became
such a strong focus of American public diplomacy (Bardos 426). Although in 1938 FDR created
the Division of Cultural Relations within the State Department to encourage cultural diplomacy,
the U.S. didn‘t become thoroughly engaged in the ideological fight worldwide until the war
(Cull, The Cold War 11-12). FDR continued implementation of additional cultural diplomatic
initiatives such as the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs, headed by
Nelson Rockefeller, and the Office of the Coordinator of Information, which largely targeted
Latin America (Cull, The Cold War 12-13). During this time, the U.S.‘s ideological engagement
in the war became extremely significant and symbolic, because the fight against Hitler ―became
increasingly identified with the historical mission of the United States‖ (Cull, The Cold War 12).
Americans identified with the fight against Hitler because he symbolized a threat to every value
and idea for which America stood. As the motive for war became more personal, public
diplomacy rhetorical strategies became more significant and began to emerge largely inside two
agencies—the Voice of America and the Office of War Information.
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Voice of America (VOA)
Many of the campaigns and initiatives in public diplomacy following World War II were
based on articulating FDR‘s four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom to worship, freedom
from want, and freedom from fear (Waller, The Public 100-101). As the need for more
ideological engagement worldwide became apparent, FDR created the Foreign Information
Service in 1941, which later became the Office of War Information (Cull, The Cold War 13).
This office oversaw the creation of the VOA radio broadcast, which continues to be paramount
in U.S. public diplomacy (Hixson 2).
The VOA radio broadcast was first launched following the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor
(Cull, The Cold War 14). The goal of the VOA was to ―tell the truth‖ to the world (Cull, The
Cold War 14). The first broadcasts were in Europe twenty-four hours a day and eventually
reached over 100 million people in 45 languages (Galal 2; Hixson 29). The VOA was deemed a
―reliable source of news‖ available for people who could not trust their own countries‘ news
sources, and it became a major tool for disseminating our rhetorical appeals (Bardos 428). The
VOA is a crucial example to highlight because it continues to serve as a major agent in
exercising American public diplomacy rhetoric despite varying historical contexts.
When it started, the role of the VOA was ―to disseminate information pertaining to
American life, policy, industry, techniques, culture, and customs‖ (qtd. in Cull, The Cold War
31). The VOA enabled the U.S. to appeal to foreign audiences by rhetorically constructing
information about the U.S. to enhance our credibility as well as persuade the audience to identify
with our politics. The VOA broadcast became so successful in the ideological fight against
communism that the Soviets began jamming the broadcasts in 1949 (Hixson 33). Despite Soviet
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efforts to inhibit VOA broadcasting, Truman devised ways to curtail Soviet jamming and the
VOA continued to broadcast ―truthful information‖ to communist countries (Hixson 35-37).
As with any government initiative, the VOA was controversial because some believed it
was not a truthful source of news and could never fully represent all the varying American voices
(Hixson 30). Interestingly, the VOA mandate was not written into law until 1976, which stated
information must be presented that is ―accurate, objective, and comprehensive‖ (qtd. in Tuch
88). Although the VOA still hails itself as ―a trusted source of news and information,‖ 5 the VOA
still uses rhetoric to promote American interests even with the charter. In fact, the Broadcasting
Board of Governors runs the VOA and describes the VOA‘s strategic goal as ―reporting [that]
provides an alternative to extremism and authoritarianism, fosters respect for human rights,
supports popular aspirations for freedom in repressive societies, and communicates what
America stands for—our policies, values and culture‖(―BBG Fact Sheet‖). As this statement
shows, the goal of VOA is inherently rhetorical because the larger objective is to report news
that not only communicates information but also American values and interests. Therefore, the
VOA exemplifies a consistent rhetorical process despite the changing political contexts in
American public diplomacy.
Office of War Information (OWI)
Shortly after the launch of the VOA, the OWI became more engaged worldwide by
expanding its reach to Africa and East Asia distributing foreign policy information via books,
magazines, newspapers, films, leaflets, and radio (Cull, The Cold War 15-17). Over the next
several years the OWI continued to expand and develop various divisions such as the Political
Warfare Division and the Division of Cultural Relations, all of which worked to implement
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ideological rhetoric in the quest for de-nazification (Cull, The Cold War 18-20). For example, the
OWI used its Political Warfare Division to spread messages demonizing the enemy through
leaflets and radio (Cull, The Cold War 17). The OWI focused and relied upon ideology to create
identification with foreign publics. The OWI continued to characterize the enemy this way both
during the World War II and Cold War as the ideological fight grew more significant (Cull, The
Cold War 20).
One scholar explains that the Cold War divided the world ―into a bi-polar competition
that was characterized more by a war of words and the threatened use of nuclear weapons rather
than their actual use‖ (Taylor 250). This historical context reveals how the focus on ideological
differences was the result of the ―rhetorical necessities‖ of that moment (Wrage 33). The
rhetorical emphasis on identification, enemy construction, and ethos not only became salient in
our public diplomacy tactics, but was embodied in similar methods that continued to contribute
to the persisting rhetorical process in American public diplomacy.
The Challenges of the Cold War Bring Public Diplomacy Forward
The history of Cold War public diplomacy elucidates our widespread emphasis on
rhetoric during the Cold War, which has been called a ―contest of ideologies‖ and a ―war of
words‖ (Taylor 250). After the defeat of the Nazis, a common enemy to fight no longer existed.
(Taylor 250). Instead, the Soviets emerged as the U.S.‘s primary enemy, and tactics were used to
solidify the uncertainty and terror felt because of this enemy (Taylor 253). We began to argue
that the Soviets represented a deep-seated evil, and we tried to rally other countries to join our
cause. The Soviets‘ worldwide diplomacy was well funded, and it became vital that we counter
this effort with massive public diplomacy tactics of our own (Taylor 256).
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Implemented in 1948, the Smith-Mundt Act sought to renew American communication
with the world and the goal to ―promote a better understanding of the United States in other
countries, and to increase mutual understanding‖ (qtd. in Taylor 256). This act allowed the U.S.
to target foreign publics through all forms of communication, ―including print, radio, film,
exchange programs, and exhibitions‖ (Hixson 11).6 The Smith-Mundt Act served as a license for
our government to engage in numerous persuasive strategies for years to come. The SmithMundt Act further exemplifies the importance we put on public diplomacy tactics, thus giving
evidence to our reliance and use of rhetoric in public diplomacy. It was during the Cold War that
targeting foreign publics became extremely significant.
The 1948 Marshall Plan, which was devised to help in the economic recovery of
European countries following World War II, was also influential (Cull, The Cold War 37).
Although the plan was initially supposed to inform Europeans of the positive engagement of the
U.S. in Europe, it eventually became a means to inspire foreign audiences about ―the American
way of life‖ (Cull, The Cold War 38). Instead of engaging exclusively in efforts to renew
Europe‘s economy, the Marshall Plan became an outlet for ―the assimilation of American
technical and business acumen‖ (Hogan 428). The plan worked to create and implement
initiatives for a neo-capitalist society in Europe that helped the U.S. ―achieve the political and
strategic objectives of American diplomacy‖ (Hogan 429). As Waller suggests, the goal of the
plan was to essentially ―win the hearts and minds of Europeans‖ (The Public 199). Although the
Marshall Plan was put in place to help ―revive Europe‘s shattered economies,‖ the plan was tied
to the larger diplomatic goals of the United States to further persuade foreign publics that we

6

However, the Act also later banned the United States Information Agency and the State Department from
propagating information within the United States (Waller 488). And currently the details of the Act are being
debated and whether our current political context/crisis warrants changes to the Smith-Mundt Act.

41
were not the enemy, but rather a trusted resource during crisis. Although The Marshall Plan
resulted from a crisis in Europe, it provided the U.S. an opportunity to use and capitalize on
rhetoric to ensure our role in the world and counter Soviet expansion.
Following the enactment of the Marshall Plan, we saw the fight against communism
become even stronger with the actions of Senator Joseph McCarthy, the House of
Representative‘s Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), the FBI and through cultural
media such as film (Taylor 258-59). The belief in the worldwide threat of the Communist enemy
became so pervasive that they were deemed the devil and represented a looming danger to all
mankind (Taylor 259). The ―Red Menace‖ came to represent everything that threatened the core
American values that the U.S. stood for (Taylor 259). Not only did we see a resurgence of public
diplomacy, but during this era, we also heavily relied upon the rhetorical construction of
communists as the enemy as well as the rhetorical use of identification. 7
The fear of the Communist threat continued through the Truman presidency. We began to
witness a more concentrated effort to promote common values and interests, especially with the
―Campaign for Truth‖ in combating communism (Taylor 257-58; Cull, The Cold War 23). This
campaign was the first strategic plan to ever officially acknowledge ―psychological activities‖ as
necessary to influence foreign publics (Cull, The Cold War 54). These activities were justified by
the rearmament program based on the 1950 National Security Council Report 68, which stated
the Soviets wanted to take down the free world (Taylor 257). The U.S. considered itself the
representative of the free world and increased its focus on expanding the ―credibility of
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American power‖ worldwide. This effort was influential in shaping American public diplomacy
efforts for years to come (Cull, The Cold War 54).
As President Truman stated in 1950, the goal of the ―Campaign for Truth‖ was to ―make
ourselves known as we really are—not as Communist propaganda pictures us‖ (qtd. in Cull, The
Cold War 55). This campaign provided a revived conviction in the fight against communism, for
we were in ―a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men‖ (qtd. in Hixson 14). The
administration attempted to convince others to identify with us rather than the communist enemy
by portraying a real, honest image of the United States. However, U.S. information strategies
were still on shaky ground. In spite of the Truman Administration‘s various ideological efforts,
we were struggling to achieve this goal (Cull, The Cold War 80). Reports of the Soviet
information campaigns showed that they were ―spending proportionately forty times as much‖ as
we were in this ideological fight (Hixson 25).
Clearly the United States needed a better infrastructure and more success in fighting
communism. This need led to the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in
1953. Under President Eisenhower, this overseas agency had a mission ―to persuade foreign
peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which are consistent with the national
objectives of the United States‖ (Galal 2). With the slogan ―Telling America‘s Story to the
World,‖ the USIA‘s goal was to persuade worldwide public opinion in both the short and long
term (Galal 2; Bardos 426). The agency attempted to exert influence through film, television,
radio, exhibitions, tours, private and citizen engagements, and international exchanges.
U.S. public diplomacy continued to expand with the USIA throughout Europe and Latin
America as the Cold War progressed. In the 1950s, we witnessed intense engagement with the
Middle East and Asia in condemning communism and promoting commonalities (Cull, The Cold
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War 120-23). The USIA played a major role in the history of American public diplomacy,
because it originated during a crisis and functioned as a major channel in convincing the world to
follow our lead.
With the USIA‘s efforts during the Eisenhower Administration, the Soviets fought back
with the launch of campaigns to promote ―peaceful coexistence.‖ The need for a more effective
strategy became imperative for the U.S. (Cull, The Cold War 126-27). This need led to an
emphasis on more initiatives to spread U.S. ideologies and the creation of the Special Ideological
Working Group in 1955. This group published books and magazines focusing on distinguishing
the difference between communism and democracy and providing explanations of ―freedom‖
(Cull, The Cold War 127).
The next turn in U.S. public diplomacy came during JFK‘s Administration. During his
campaign, he had promised to work at rejuvenating the image of the U.S. worldwide (Cull, The
Cold War 189). The JFK administration changed the approach to public diplomacy with a softer
and friendlier approach to international audiences (Waller, The Public 114). A greater focus was
also placed on citizen diplomacy and the establishment of such organizations as the Peace Corps
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (Waller, The Public 114).
In addition to these efforts, JFK hired the broadcaster Edward R. Murrow in 1961 as the
new director of the USIA in to help enhance the U.S.‘s image. Murrow played an important role
in helping to change the way USIA engaged with the world (Tuch 25-26). Murrow‘s goal for the
USIA was for it to become an ―integral part of the making as well as the execution of American
foreign policy‖ (Cull, The Cold War 190). Murrow‘s philosophy for public diplomacy can be
expressed through his famously quoted statement, ―they expect [the USIA] to be in on the crash
landings... we had better be in on the takeoffs‖ (qtd. in Waller, The Public 330). For Murrow, it
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was necessary that the USIA be involved in the making of foreign policy and not just in saving
the U.S.‘s image following poor choices. For successful public diplomacy, the USIA needed to
take on a larger role ―in the global development of ‗free governments‘ [by] engaging with
accusations of racism [and] ‗identify‘ the U.S. with ‗the revolution of rising expectations‘ across
the globe‖ (Cull, The Cold War 192). It was important to persuade the world to identify with us
and join our fight against the Soviets and Murrow played a vital role since efforts to counter
Soviet campaigns had previously been ineffective.
As the nation continued to face crises, such as the Civil Rights Movement, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam War, we relied upon both the VOA and the USIA to inform the
world of these events—but to do it by rhetorically constructing the ideals of the U.S. in the most
favorable way possible (Cull, The Cold War 206-14). For example, rather than focusing on the
internal conflicts and riots occurring during the civil rights movement, the USIA described it as
―a positive expression of the American Democratic spirit‖ (Cull, The Cold War 212). As the
Vietnam War progressed, it became extremely difficult not only for the VOA and USIA but also
for other public diplomacy programs and initiatives to convince the world of the U.S.‘s
justification in its fight against Vietnam (Cull, The Cold War 287-88). The declining state of the
U.S.‘s international image led to the 1968 Congressional hearings on ―The Future of United
States Public Diplomacy,‖ but these hearings did little to change the situation (Cull, The Cold
War 290).
When President Nixon entered the White House, American public diplomacy lost much
of its former importance (Lord, ―The Past‖ 50). Henry Kissinger, Nixon‘s National Security
Advisor, had a major impact on public diplomacy by restructuring the USIA so it no longer
influenced foreign policy (Cull, The Cold War 294). The international coverage, exhibitions, and
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goodwill tours of the 1969 moon landing were surprisingly successful efforts that proved
effective in improving worldwide public opinion of the United States (Cull, The Cold War 305306). Over the next several years, the debate continued between members of Congress on
whether U.S. public diplomacy agencies were informing foreign publics in the most effective
manner (Cull, The Cold War 340). When Jimmy Carter became president, the primary goals of
his administration were to focus on human rights and reorganize the structure of U.S. public
diplomacy (Cull, The Cold War 364; Lord, ―The Past‖ 51).
The Carter Administration and Public Diplomacy
The Carter Administration emphasized the importance of public diplomacy (Lord, ―The
Past‖ 51). In 1978, the administration restructured the USIA and temporarily renamed it the
International Communication Agency (ICA) (Lord, ―The Past‖ 51). The restructuring of the
USIA into the ICA included two major changes: 1) all public diplomacy activities happened
within the ICA whereas some had previously been carried out by the State Department, and 2)
the concept of ―mutuality‖ was added to the focus of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy would
no longer be solely about persuading or informing foreign publics but also about learning from
them (Tuch 31-32). The new emphasis on mutuality was important because it was supposed to
produce more dialogue between nations and therefore be more useful than relying on one-way
communication. Although these changes were implemented, the focus reverted back to one-way
public diplomacy tactics.
Under the direction of John Reinhardt, the newly organized ICA initially made progress
in winning the ―war of ideas‖ (Cull, The Cold War 382). But, as public diplomacy initiatives
continued to expand in the Middle East, they were not enough to counter the effects of later
events during the Carter Administration (Cull, The Cold War 383). The political environment
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surrounding the Iran Hostage Crisis forced the Carter Administration to respond rhetorically.
This crisis during the Carter Administration serves as a telling example of how the United States
continues to construct similar rhetoric and how this rhetorical process in public diplomacy is
enduring in U. S. history. There has been no other crisis in American history that is precisely
identical to the hostage crisis; however, the rhetorical response that has materialized throughout
our past persists and reveals itself anew in every crisis. To further argue the consistent nature of
public diplomacy as rhetorical process, next, I will look at the context and plan put forth by the
Carter Administration following the Iran Hostage Crisis. This plan serves as one historical
artifact where the U.S. tried to reach out to the Muslim world by rhetorically focusing on
creating identification through common values and ideals.
Iran Hostage Crisis
To understand the Carter Administration‘s Communication plan, I must first explain the
historical context, which will illuminate the rhetorical choices in greater detail. The Iran Hostage
Crisis came at a very unfortunate time for our country because we were already facing a crisis of
ideology worldwide. Our values had become questionable, and it became difficult to persuade
foreign audiences to identify with U.S. interests and ideas. With the failed war in Vietnam and
the illegal actions of the Nixon Watergate scandal, the United States had lost traction in
convincing the world to follow its lead (Farber 16).
Not only did the Iran Hostage Crisis represent a challenge to American ideology, but the
militant takeover of a U.S. embassy symbolized the greater threat of Communist control
worldwide. The civil unrest in Iran made us fearful of the overwhelming danger of the Soviet
Union (Farber 5). Although the public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world at that time were
targeted to convince them against Soviet persuasion, anti-Americanism was prevalent. This
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negative view of the U.S. continued because we were seen as ―the major force spreading this
cultural and political creed [of secular modernism] throughout the world‖ (Farber 5). The U.S.
was seen as forcefully imposing American ideologies in the Middle East which was not
welcomed.
Despite the Carter Administration‘s revitalization of public diplomacy efforts, the
administration ignored particular countries like Iran, which can be seen as a strategic and
deliberate choice (Cull, The Cold War 386). Cull argues that the Carter Administration faced a
major disparity between their ―noble rhetoric‖ of public diplomacy efforts and the reality that we
supported the Shah of Iran (The Cold War 386). This support contributed to the perception that
the U.S. was a ―hypocritical source of that country‘s ills‖ (Cull, The Cold War 386). The U.S.‘s
negative image was the result of the close allied relationship maintained with the Shah of Iran for
close to twenty-five years (Farber 103). The situation in Iran which led to the overthrow of the
Shah‘s government during the 1978 revolution was a distressing situation for the United States.
The takeover by the fundamentalist regime of the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
threatened the U.S.‘s reliance on Iran as a major oil resource as well as reaffirmed the threat of
Soviet power in the Middle East (Farber 108; Cull, The Cold War 386).
Following the government takeover in Iran, the Carter Administration realized the
severity of the situation and possible growing problems with the new Islamic fundamentalist in
power. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter‘s National Security Advisor, began briefing President Carter
on this situation by stressing the need to continue to reach out to Muslim countries in order to
help counter Islamic fundamentalism (Farber 106). At that moment it became vital that we not
only gain support against Islamic fundamentalists, but also encouraged Muslims to identify with
the U.S. and not the Soviets. We faced a crucial moment when our rhetorical choices in
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approaching the Muslim world would impact our relationship and image in the region for years
to come. Brzezinski explained that in order to gain support in the Middle East, the U.S. must
focus on our shared interests and values, which would help communicate our greater ―support for
a world of diversity‖ (qtd. in Farber 107). Unfortunately, this did not materialize in the form of
much diplomatic engagement or dialogue and contributed to our difficulty in persuading
Muslims. It became clear the U.S. was failing to convince Muslims in the ideological fight
against the Soviets and more needed to be done.
Not long before the Iran Hostage Crisis, Brzezinski expressed concern that we were
losing the ideological battle against the Soviet Union, had been ―excessively acquiescent,‖ and
that President Carter must ―toughen both the tone and the substance of our foreign policy‖ (qtd.
in Farber 118). During the Carter Administration, the international perception of the U.S.
continued to be unfavorable. Brzezinski became increasingly concerned that we were unable to
prove to the world that we were more invested than the Soviet Union in worldwide interests
(Farber 118).
The attitude of Muslim countries toward the U.S. continued to decline—particularly
when President Carter allowed the Shah to seek refuge in the United States on October 23, 1979.
This action further angered militant students, who stated that ―by allowing the Shah to enter the
U.S., the Americans have started a new conspiracy against the revolution. If we don‘t act rapidly,
if we show weakness, then a superpower like the U.S. will be able to meddle in the internal
affairs of any nation in the world‖ (qtd. in Farber 128-29). These students wanted their actions to
not only to be symbolic of Iran‘s sovereign power in opposition to the superpower but to further
represent support and strength for any nation who felt the U.S. was interfering in their affairs.
This agitated political climate in Iran led to a crisis for the United States. On November 4, 1979,
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student demonstrators overpowered the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking hostages (Sick 197, 214).
The students who took over the American embassy felt this was a way to show everyone in the
world that the power of the American government was wavering and that ―God is the ultimate
power‖ (qtd. in Faber 129). The students felt their actions were symbolic of God‘s power and
that despite the power Americans held, no one, not even the U.S., could overcome the ultimate
will of God.
Although the U.S. embassy was taken over by demonstrating students with whom
Khomeini claimed he had no involvement, the takeover no longer represented an act of political
protest; instead it became an all-out battle of Iran verses the United States (Sick 209). The
struggle was no longer about negotiating with militant students; it morphed into a campaign of
convincing the world to unite against Iran through the ―demonstration of the powers of moral
and political suasion‖ (Sick 217). The U.S. rallied every possible resource in order to condemn
Iran and assert its position of power in the world. Various means of persuasion were employed
by the U.S. not only to denounce the student‘s actions but garner support against Iran.
The hostage crisis resulted in immediate efforts to counter anti-American sentiment
throughout the Muslim world. Gary Sick described the ―U.S. campaign of persuasion and
pressure that was mounted in the days and weeks following‖ this crisis as ―probably the most
extensive and sustained effort of its kind‖ to date (217). The Special Coordination Committee
began the effort to analyze the situation the very next day. Headed by Brzezinski, it was the first
of many meetings, but no one expected the crisis would last as long as it did (Farber 139-42).
Several days following the taking of the American embassy, Brzezinski required that the
VOA Farsi service conduct programming in the Middle East (Cull, The Cold War 388). The goal
of this programming was to portray the Soviet Union in an unfavorable light because the
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unraveling situation threatened our relationship with Iran and might lead to the Soviets gaining
power in the Middle East (Cull, The Cold War 388). James M. Rentschler, a member of the
National Security Council, recommended that our programming put extensive focus on
identification with Muslims by drawing attention to ―the commonality of values, spiritual and
secular, that link our societies‖ (memo to Brzezinski 12/3/79). Efforts continued as the attackers
held the Americans hostage for 444 days and we persisted with the use of international opinion,
the U.N. Security Council, and the removal of the Shah (Farber 12). However, winning the war
of ideas required much more involvement in the Muslim world (Farber 12).The administration‘s
executive branch spearheaded a communication effort illuminating the rhetorical process within
American public diplomacy and foreshadowing the forthcoming ideological struggles we would
face with the Muslim world.
Communicating with Muslim Countries
One month following the hostage takeover of the American embassy in Tehran, the
Carter Administration responded to the crisis with a hastily designed communication plan
intended to engage the Middle East. Both Brzezinski and the ICA director, John Reinhardt, were
major players in formulating and implementing this response plan to counter anti-Americanism
and Soviet rhetoric in Muslim countries. On December 12, 1979, Brzezinski informed Reinhardt
that communication with Muslim countries must be enhanced, and it was important to
―underscore American identification with the authentic values for which Islam stands‖ (memo to
Reinhardt 12/12/79). In response to Brzezinski‘s request, Reinhardt outlined a plan with both a
simplified focus and goals, in order to create identification with Muslims based on common
values and interests (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). This text constitutes an example of the
historical process of public diplomacy rhetoric in the United States. By analyzing this historic
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rhetoric, we can further understand how our nation continues to use similar ideological tactics,
and how the 1979 communication plan purposed during the Iran crisis is not that different from
the NSPDSC composed in response to the attacks on 9/11.
The Text
The communication plan composed to address Muslim countries was a hurried endeavor.
The U.S. faced an immediate crisis and a rapid response was necessary. Essentially, two main
players at that time crafted this communication proposal: Brzezinski and Reinhardt. Documents
from The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library reveal that they discussed the ideas and composed
the actual plan in the form of confidential memos, although they briefed other members of the
National Security Council on the plan as well (Reinhardt memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79,
Brzesinski memo to Reinhardt 12/12/79) .
The final, succinct four-page plan is detailed in a memo from Reinhardt to Brzezinski on
December 12, 1979, with the subject line ―Communication with Muslim Countries‖ (memo to
Brzezinski 12/12/79). They defined the plan as a response to two major ―phenomena which
require[d] urgent address‖ briefly explained as the negative perception of the U.S. in the Islamic
world and the need to ―engage Muslims‖ by emphasizing commonalities and identification,
which both needed to be addressed in the short and long term (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79).
Although the plan addresses both short and long-term goals, they were both seen as equally
pressing. Following the explanation of the goals for communicating with Muslim countries,
Reinhardt details a nine-point action plan. This text reveals the use of the rhetorical process of
identification and its contributing strategies of enemy construction and ethos enhancement.
Rhetorical identification takes place when people are ―identified in terms of some
principle they share in common‖ or when they share ―substance‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives
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21). The use of identification cannot be present without its antithesis, division; thus, rhetorical
identification leads to acknowledging the enemy or other (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 22).
Identification must be ―affirmed precisely because there is division‖ and only is useful in this
antagonistic relationship (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 22). Therefore, to create identification in
opposition to the enemy, one must emphasize the shared common interests or substance with the
audience. Within this part of the process of identification, the use of ethos or elements of
character becomes necessary because one can be persuaded ―only insofar as you can talk his
language by [...] image, attitude, idea identifying your ways with his‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of
Motives 55). As Aristotle describes, the importance of ethos in persuasion, in addition to ―good
sense, good moral character, and goodwill,‖ is useful even without ―any proof of it‖ (91). The
use of ethos and enemy definition are contributing appeals within the rhetorical process of
identification. Next, I will explain the specific appeals to identification within this
communication plan.
Identification
One of the major rhetorical themes in the plan drafted by the Carter Administration is the
reliance on the use of identification. The process of working to create identification is ubiquitous
throughout the four page memo. The plan discusses the ways that the U.S. can work to identify
itself with Muslims and the religion of Islam to meet our needs. The short-term goals of the plan
address how the U.S. was perceived as an enemy to Islam in the Middle East. In order to change
this negative perception, we needed to counter the idea that the ―U.S. is hostile to the whole of
Islam‖ by placing ourselves alongside of Islam and focusing extensively on identification (memo
to Brzezinski 12/12/79). We needed to clarify that Americans were aware there existed ―various
manifestations of Islam‖ and that we respected the Islamic religion, but we did not support the
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side of Islam of the fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). By
working to create a clear rhetorical distinction between the different facets of Islam, the plan
explains, ―U.S. interests will be served by projecting our appreciation of the fact that Islam takes
many forms, of which the Ayatollah is not a leading representation‖ (memo to Brzezinski
12/12/79). The goal of creating this kind of identification was not only to change the perception
Muslims had about the United States‘ appreciation for Islam, but also to reiterate the idea that we
were working with the Middle Eastern nations and not against them. For example, the plan
points to the need to respond ―to both their general ‗Third World‘ identity and their role as
representatives of a serious religion, many (but not all) of whose values we share‖ (memo to
Brzezinski 12/12/79). Distinguishing their religion as valuable is important because with
rhetorical identification, we are ―both joined and separate‖ and identify with one another based
on common substance or shared commonality. Therefore, ―‗identification‘ [...] does not deny [...]
distinctiveness‖ and despite the fact that one may be persuaded to identify another, individuality
is not dismissed (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 21).
A concentration on common interests or substance is necessary in creating identification
because it elucidates the many values that are shared despite individual differences. The plan
addresses how ―a principal purpose of this continuing discourse will be to expand awareness of
commonalities where they exist‖ (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). The emphasis on identification
with the Muslim world focused on values and commonalities. This focus was key in countering
any hostility to the U.S. and hopefully influencing the negative perception of the U.S.
particularly in Iran as well as surrounding countries. The plan further describes how we must
―involve religious/intellectual leaders from Muslim countries in much more directly valuecentered discussions with American counterparts both in the U.S. and abroad‖ (memo to
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Brzezinski 12/12/79). The use of identification in this communication plan not only reiterates the
commonalities between the U.S. and the Muslim world but also further defines the common
enemy.
Enemy Construction
The United States was not only facing the students who took hostages and control over
the American embassy, but we were also fighting the greater threat of Soviet power in the
Middle East. It was absolutely vital that we gain the support of the Muslim world to side with the
U.S. over the Soviets because, as Brzezinski stated, they were a threat to the ―domination of
Middle East oil‖ (qtd. in Farber 170). As the plan shows, gaining support against the Soviets
became essential as part of the plan‘s conception. Members of the Carter Administration knew it
was imperative to do everything in the Muslim world ―to erode Soviet identification with the
non-aligned countries,‖ and in order to do this, Soviets must be constructed as the ‗other‘ (memo
to Brzezinski 12/12/79).
In constructing the enemy, they must be ―identifiable persons or stereotypes of persons to
whom evil traits, intentions, or actions can be attributed‖ (Edelman 87). This communication
plan achieves this goal by attributing the situation in Afghanistan with the Soviets. The plan
states, ―For both short- and long-term purposes, the invasion of Afghanistan provides an
extraordinary opportunity (which we are seizing) to dramatize Soviet military and cultural
imperialism‖ (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). By rhetorically emphasizing the situation in
Afghanistan and the Soviet‘s connection to it, we hoped to dispel any thought that the Soviets
were anything but the enemy. The use of enemy construction furthers the idea of the Soviet
Union as ―evil‖ and accentuates the dangers Muslims faced if they identified with the Soviets.
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Clearly defining the enemy inherently led to an emphasis on enhancing the ethos of the United
States.
Ethos Enhancement
This communication plan‘s use of ethos works to address ways to improve the U.S.‘s
image in the Muslim world. The plan describes specific rhetorical tactics that we needed to
implement to increase goodwill toward the U.S. In order to enhance ―U.S. interests,‖ the plan
states it was necessary for us to continue ―projecting our appreciation of the fact that Islam takes
many forms‖ because in doing this, the perception of the U.S. would become more positive. The
plan states that such rhetoric would be used in ―media output‖ and also through ―official public
statements‖ (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). The plan emphasizes the need to ―enhance our own
psychological posture in Muslim minds,‖ which essentially stresses the rhetorical importance of
heightening the character of the U.S. and the need ―to engage with influential Muslims‖ (memo
to Brzezinski 12/12/79). By persuading ―influential Muslims‖ that the U.S. possessed nothing
but goodwill toward the Middle East and Islam, we would enhance the U.S.‘s moral character
and also inevitably reach a larger population of Muslims, thus forwarding our goals. The focus
on ―influential Muslims‖ allows us to communicate our commonalities via these ―influential‖
individuals to part of the Muslim public we normally would not be able to reach, therefore
furthering our ability to enhance our ethos.
Another tactic of the plan that ensures a focus on ethos involved reaching out to Muslim
students in the U.S. and finding ―ways of enhancing the probability that their experiences here
will contribute to the objectives outlined‖ (memo to Brzezinski 12/12/79). This communication
plan sought to find every possible way to work and implement rhetorical uses of ethos
enhancement. The composition of the ―Communication with Muslim Countries‖ memo in
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response to the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979 by the Carter Administration‘s executive branch is a
useful example for examining the rhetorical process of American public diplomacy.
As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3, the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC) reveals many of the same rhetorical tactics
used in the Carter Administration ―Communication with Muslim Countries‖ plan and is
stunningly similar to present plans for engaging the Muslim world. This plan was drafted in
response to the Iranian Hostage Crisis but, unfortunately, was not as effective as the Carter
Administration had hoped. This communication plan illustrates how American public diplomacy
rhetoric has not changed throughout history even with the different contexts, and the principal
goals of American public diplomacy in the Middle East remain today.
Conclusion
Today, as the U.S. again faces crises, we must learn from our past and look at historical
examples of public diplomacy efforts like the communication plan with Muslim countries that
was put forth by the Carter Administration. The crisis in Iran involving the fall of the Shah, the
takeover by the fundamental Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the taking of American hostages
at the American embassy became the biggest failure of the Carter Administration (Farber 11-12).
As Farber states, the overwhelming failure at that time in Iran and the Middle East ―led,
indirectly, some two decades later‖ to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (8).
The communication plan put forth by the Carter Administration serves as a comparative
rhetorical example from U.S. history that helps illuminate how this public diplomacy process is
continuing. Presently, we see its emergence in the face of the crisis on September 11 and the U.S.
National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. The preceding outline of
the history of U.S. public diplomacy shows how this process is woven into a very deep part of
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American politics, which we continue to iterate in the face of crisis. Although no context has
been exactly the same as that of the Iran Hostage Crisis, the consistent rhetorical appeals of
identification, ethos, and enemy construction continue to reveal themselves.
The analysis of the Carter Administration‘s plan serves as a comparative example that the
rhetorical choices of identification, enemy construction, and ethos are not unique to 9/11 and
further iterates the need for rhetorical analysis in the field of public diplomacy. The next chapter
analyzes the rhetorical workings within the NSPDSC plan and shows that although the political
environment changes, the rhetorical responses primarily stay the same.
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Chapter 3:
Rhetorical Identification in the
2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
We will lead the cause of freedom, justice, and hope, because both our values and our interests
demand it. We believe in the timeless truth: To whom much is given, much is required. We also
know that nations with free, healthy, prosperous people will be sources of stability, not breeding
grounds for extremists and hate and terror. By making the world more hopeful, we make the
world more peaceful- and helping others, the American people must understand we help
ourselves.
President George W. Bush8
As the United States continues to fight its War against Terror, a rhetorical process of
American public diplomacy continues to reveal itself. As I have shown in previous chapters,
public diplomacy rhetoric is created in response to a particular historical context or crisis.
American public diplomacy has historically relied on identification with enemy construction and
appeals to Aristotelian ethos. In my analysis of the 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (NSPDSC), I will show how this communication plan
exemplifies the rhetorical choices of the United States including identification through the use of
ethos by creating a common ground and constructing the ‗other‘ or enemy. My analysis will
show that the rhetorical process of identification used by our administration reveals significant
parallels between the 2007 NSPDSC and the Carter Administration‘s plan, ―Communication
with Muslim Countries.‖ The 2007 NSPDSC, like Carter‘s plan, constitutes a significant
example of the recurring historical process in American public diplomacy that I have outlined in
previous chapters and requires further attention as the first U.S. strategy of this magnitude that
sought to implement a single departmental identification strategy in approaching foreign
audiences and most specifically the Muslim world

8

As quoted on cover page of ―U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.‖

Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee. June 2007. Web.10 May 2008.
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Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, relations with the Muslim world
were strained. As many previous efforts had proved unsuccessful in winning the ―hearts and
minds‖ of the Muslim world, the 2007 NSPDSC was devised as a communication strategy to
persuade people in the Middle East to side with us in the War on Terror. In addition to this goal,
this communication strategy was also designed to persuade Muslims that the United States is not
their enemy. Like the communication plan put forth under the Carter Administration, the 2007
NSPDSC addressed the Muslim world and emphasized identification through common interests
and values, enemy construction, and specific appeals to national ethos.
Despite other similarities with Carter‘s Communication Plan with Muslim Countries, the
2007 NSPDSC is unique as the first strategic communication plan composed for implementation
in all sectors of the government. The NSPDSC is considered the first ever national strategic
communication plan of this caliber developed in U.S. public diplomacy. Therefore, the NSPDSC
not only warrants attention as a historical text in American public diplomacy but also because of
the potential influence the plan would have had if it had been implemented in all government
agencies.
The NSPDSC was also the first broad scale plan that served as a set of guidelines for
each of the government‘s agencies in composing their own individual communication plans. Due
to the enormity of this endeavor—as comprehensive and reflective of all aspects of
government—the NSPDSC took a great deal of time to craft with the necessary input of many
sectors. As the Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Karen Hughes stated in
the cover message of the strategy, ―The plan was developed by the inter-agency PCC on strategic
communications and is the result of extensive input from different agencies, as well as major
recommendations from more than 30 reports on public diplomacy, GAO reports, IG
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recommendations and consultations with private sector communications professionals‖ and
serves as a ―comprehensive blueprint that brings all of our resources to bear on representing
America as a whole‖ (Waller, ―Exclusive: New State Department‖). Hughes‘ introduction to the
NSPDSC reiterates the importance of this plan not only at the government level but in American
society as a whole. While crafting the NSPDSC, Hughes and the Policy Coordinating Committee
considered recommendations not only from government reports but various scholars, NGOs,
consultants and other professionals in composing a coherent communication strategy that depicts
all aspects of the U.S. The NSPDSC was composed at a crucial time when the U.S. image was
suffering a deep decline.
After 9/11 and the military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. was desperate for
anything that would counter its unfavorable image in the Muslim world, therefore the NSPDSC
was highly anticipated (Dale, ―Credible American diplomacy‖). This political situation prompted
the development of this ―new‖ strategy to combat extremist ideology. Despite high expectations,
this ―new‖ communication strategy proved itself to be a recreation of past American public
diplomacy rhetoric. For, ―the strength, success and security of the United States of America rest
on our commitment to certain fundamental values and principles. These values gave birth to our
nation, and govern our actions in the world,‖ it is these values which have and continue to shape
our public diplomacy tactics (NSPDSC 2). The NSPDSC, like former public diplomacy rhetoric,
reflects how the historical and political contexts serve a ―social utility‖ for public diplomacy
during specific times while also intrinsically linked by these fundamental values. These values
influence forthcoming rhetoric and shape how we continue to rhetorically engage the world, and
show how creating identification over common values and interests continues to be essential in
our public diplomacy efforts.
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Major Themes in the NSPDSC
This chapter first illuminates the rhetoric of the 2007 NSPDSC through Burke‘s concept
of identification. Next, I will argue that the NSPDSC further exemplifies the continuing
rhetorical process of American public diplomacy by examining the rhetorical workings of the
process of identification and its interrelated appeals to ethos and enemy construction within this
text. As I have demonstrated in earlier chapters, the process of identification is not unique to a
single political context. We continually see a resurgence of identification during times of crisis,
evident in the post 9/11 public diplomacy efforts. Through an analysis of the NSPDSC I show
how the U.S. continues to return to the rhetorical process of identification, appeals to ethos and
enemy construction as a means to reaching foreign audiences.
As explained in Chapter 2, Burke‘s concept of identification is significant because
identification reveals not only how we confront division from the enemy but how we unify with
one another. Therefore, enemy construction and appeals to ethos become relevant. Using this
framework, I return to Burke‘s explanation that identification takes place when, ―A is not
identified with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified with B.
[...] In being identified with B, A is ―substantially one‖ with a person other than himself. [...]
Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstantial with another‖
(Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 20-21). Therefore, by drawing attention to the ‗other,‘ what divides
you from ‗them,‘ the other is brought into focus. And by distinguishing A from B, ethos comes
into play, because it is these appeals to ethos and identifying common substances that work to
create identification between A and B.
In the following sections, I first highlight the main themes within the NSPDSC, and then
examine how the use of ethos and its interrelated components of finding substance/common
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ground and the ability to be joined but separated are used. Next, I address the ongoing emphasis
on enemy construction through uniting against a common enemy, which is part of the larger
rhetorical process of identification. Finally, I draw specific attention to the ―Core MessagesSpecific to the War on Terror‖ that constitutes a significant and problematic rhetorical example
of my inquiry in the NSPDSC. Through the examination of this text, I demonstrate how this
method of analysis is significant to American public diplomacy by arguing how the NSPDSC
illuminates the importance of this rhetoric in American history and reveals parallels to past
reactions to crisis by the executive branch. This analysis of the text will explore the current state
of American public diplomacy rhetoric and show how it simultaneously serves as a comparable
example of past American public diplomacy efforts, such as the Carter Administration‘s
Communication plan with Muslim Countries. In Chapter 4, I will further discuss this analysis of
the rhetoric of the NSPDSC, as well as argue that the examination of the broader history of
American public diplomacy will allow us to better expose and understand the underlying
possibilities and problems we will face in the future.
Although the NSPDSC was conceived as the underlying strategy for all American public
diplomacy, it is clear in reading the document that with the U.S.‘s image crisis in the Middle East
and the threat of extremism and terrorism in that region, that the intended targeted audience of
the implemented communication plan was Muslims. As this analysis will demonstrate
identification within the plan is used to reach the Muslim World and once again, the U.S. is
―engaged in an international struggle of ideas and ideologies‖ (NSPDSC 11). And it is because
of this struggle that we rely on former rhetorical choices similar to the ones we have used
throughout American public diplomacy history and more specifically during the Carter
Administration‘s 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis, ―Communication Plan with Muslims.‖
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The NSPDSC is a more in depth and detailed document than the Communication Plan put
forth by the Carter Administration which was drafted over several days. These differences likely
result from the amount of time spent developing each plan. The Undersecretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the Policy Coordinating Committee spent close to a year
developing the NSPDSC. The document is thirty-four pages long, but the actual plan is only
twelve pages. The core plan comprised the following pieces: Mission and Priorities, Strategic
Objectives, Strategic Audiences, Public Diplomacy Priorities, Interagency Coordination, Initial
Communication Activities, Needed Resources, and Conclusion. The remaining pages are five
attachments called the Action Plan for Strategic Objectives, General Communication Guidelines,
Core Messages Both General and Specific to the War on Terrorism, Additional Communication
Vehicles, and Evaluation and Accountability. Each piece of the plan was created to build a
comprehensive strategy that government officials and departments would use as a guide in
achieving the U.S.‘s larger goal of gaining support worldwide in our fight against extremism and
most specifically from the Middle East.
Overview of the rhetorical workings of the NSPDSC
The rhetorical themes of the NSPDSC can be succinctly described as ―communicating
America‘s views, values and policies in effective ways to audiences across the world,‖ which
will be explored in further length within this chapter (12). By focusing on communicating
―America‘s views, values and policies,‖ we can see that the use of rhetoric becomes pivotal
within the NSPDSC. These rhetorical choices are outlined as three strategic objectives on page
three of the plan, which are representative of the primary rhetorical focus in the NSPDSC and
reveal the use of identification and its corresponding appeals to ethos and enemy construction.
The strategic objectives are as follows:
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I. America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in our
most basic values.
II. With our partners, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten
the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith.
III. America must work to nurture common interests and values between Americans and
peoples of different countries, cultures and faiths across the world (3).

Ethos: The first objective solicits attention to American ethos by stating that our country
represents ―hope‖ and ―opportunity‖ in the world, thus a symbol of goodwill. The focus on ethos
works to characterize America as a positive force in the world, based on the fundamental
―values‖ that shape our country and by identifying with America, others will have access to more
opportunities. This leads to the idea that the U.S. is more credible because we are working not
only to improve the lives of Americans but all people worldwide. Using ethos in this way is
important in providing an opportunity for greater persuasion because the principle goal of the
U.S. is presented as bringing progress to people everywhere.
Enemy Construction: The second objective defines the enemy and amplifies the danger
posed by that enemy, stating that ―violent extremists‖ challenge the ―freedom and peace‖ not
only of Americans but of ―civilized people of every nation, culture and faith.‖ Such language
defines the enemy in opposition to all freedom-loving and peace-seeking people worldwide
while simultaneously reiterating the ―they‖ verses ―us‖ division, and the use of ―civilized‖
inherently generates its opposite, the ―barbaric‖ other, which rhetorically constructs the enemy
(Ivie, Democracy 149). The use of this language automatically creates the binaries of ―us‖ vs.
―them‖ which creates identification and simultaneously a rhetorical division that results in
particular valued associations of the defined enemy or other. Associating values with the other
allows more opportunities for persuasion because it provides an additional reason for the
audience to identify against an enemy who possess no moral compass.
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Identification: The third objective delineates the focus in this plan and its reliance on
creating identification based on a common substance, or ―interests and values,‖ which allows
Americans and foreign publics to be consubstantial. This rhetoric allows consubstantiality
through identification because it seeks to create unity over a commonality or substance. But this
rhetoric maintains the uniqueness of all individuals emphasizing that although we may have
varying cultures and faiths, ultimately, our ―interests and values‖ are the same, therefore we are
―both joined and separate‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 21). This distinction of being joined and
separate reiterates that although we may differ in religion, politics and ways of living, we are
bound by common interests and values all human beings share.
I will argue these objectives constitute the rhetorical themes that are continually used in
American public diplomacy. These objectives are representative of the document as a whole and
provide a brief overview into the themes that I analyze within the NSPDSC and further argue is
representative of the perpetual use of rhetorical identification in the history of American public
diplomacy. In the following sections I delve into further detail about each corresponding part of
my analysis. First, I will return to how the use of ethos is an important component within the
process of identification.
Framework of Ethos
Aristotle describes that in the theory of ethos, for a rhetor ethos is the ―most effective
means of persuasion he possesses‖ (25). Ethos or character in persuasion is used when there is
the ability to ―inspire trust in [the] audience‖ through the ―good qualities‖ of ―good sense, good
moral character, and goodwill‖ (91). When these qualities are present in rhetoric, ethos is useful
in persuading an audience to identify with the rhetor. Aristotle explains that when opinions are
divided, ethos helps ―make us think him credible [because] we believe good men more fully and
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more readily than others‖ (25). Therefore, one is more likely to identify with someone who
presents themselves as more credible and trustworthy. In extending this theory, Burke argues that
within ethos are the ―conditions of identification‖ for it is only when a rhetor shows the
―appropriate signs of character‖ by ―identifying your ways with his‖ is it possible to persuade
them of a particular opinion (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 55). And by using one‘s character or
goodwill to establish similar qualities, identification works to persuade one to identify with the
rhetor along with differing ―opinions,‖ ―attitudes,‖ or ―values‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 5556). The use of ethos is extremely important in identification, because people want to identify
with others who possess good moral characteristics.
Ethos in NSPDSC
The use of ethos is an essential part of the NSPDSC designed to help improve the image
of the United States and served to ―spotlight ways in which American assistance is helping real
people achieve better lives‖ (14). The NSPDSC works to encourage government officials and
departments to emphasize positive actions of the American government worldwide, in order to
elicit identification with other people which projects goodwill toward the United States while
attempting to strengthen our country‘s image. There are a variety of instances in the NSPDSC
that emphasize the importance of America‘s actions of goodwill towards the world. For example,
one section explains the importance of ―America‘s deeds,‖ and how we must highlight ―the
tremendous impact Americans are making on lives around the world every day‖ (7). An
emphasis on the U.S.‘s good deeds works to strengthen American ethos because detailing
positive U.S. actions provides proof to the audience that the U.S. is a prominent resource for
people in need across the world.
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The report also continues to claim, ―all agencies and embassies should make a major
commitment to more aggressively tell the story of how [...] programs are helping people improve
their lives and opportunities‖ (7). This highlights the need for departmental officials to seek out
every possible uplifting story that represents how the U.S. provides for people worldwide and
vigorously communicate these examples.
Drawing attention to American efforts worldwide provides useful in enhancing ethos by
working to extend others‘ goodwill towards the United States and show our level of morality and
generosity towards others. Crafting a positive ethos is essential in gaining the trust of the
audience because without this ability to persuade an audience of one‘s good moral character, it is
difficult to encourage identification and further persuade them of particular opinions.
The rhetoric within the NSPDSC emphasizes the need for public officials to enhance
ethos by communicating values that highlight American efforts worldwide in order to illustrate
the spirit of selflessness of Americans. The NSPDSC states that all public officials and
departments need to focus on the fact that the U.S. is a positive force and ―across the world,
America feeds the poor, educates the illiterate, cares for the sick and responds to disasters‖ (13).
Thus the plan encourages a concentration on the global actions of Americans which provides an
opportunity to enhance the credibility of the United States as an influential country in the world,
thus placing us on a higher moral ground in the fight for the greater good of all humankind. The
strategy describes the need for all government officials and departments to draw attention to ―key
influencers‖ which can work to generate ―a ripple effect throughout society‖ and provide greater
opportunities to convince the intended target that the U.S.‘s intentions stem from a place of
goodwill and trust (4). Encouraging communication that draws attention to important individuals
or ―opinion leaders‖ deemed representative of good character, values, and persuasions of Muslim
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faith, allows more opportunities to further enhance ethos because these ―clerics, educators,
journalists, women leaders, business and labor leaders‖ in these societies can be useful in
advancing overall U.S. goals (4).
The NSPDSC reinforces that public officials and departments must use ethos in
communication tactics to foster more confidence and trust in the ideals of the United States,
because ―we believe all people are equal and equally valuable, we believe people everywhere
should be free to speak their mind, to participate in their government, to worship as their
conscience dictates, to assemble freely and to pursue opportunity, economic, political and
creative‖ (27). This statement is significant because it represents the values that can help advance
the moral character of the United States and create trust thus this rhetoric can provides an
opportunity for identification. By pinpointing the rhetorical need to associate the U.S. with
characteristics of freedom and other human rights, communication efforts implemented by
government officials in persuading the target audience of a particular opinion are more likely to
be successful. This kind of approach serves as a tool to help government officials in crafting
more effective rhetoric because it becomes almost impossible for anyone to argue against a
desire for a society possessing such characteristics for these things could arguably be the fantasy
for all human beings. The NSPDSC emphasizes that the U.S. must be communicated as a beacon
of hope that can provide an opportunity for all people to possess such human rights therefore
situating the U.S. as not only as inspirational but the key to Muslims ever acquiring similar
freedoms.
Therefore, it is at this juncture that the audience the plan seeks to communicate with can
be easily persuaded to identify with us. The United States no longer becomes defined in the
audience‘s eyes as just a favorable country but rather one symbolic of human rights and values
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that the U.S. believes our targeted audience wishes to achieve. By placing such an emphasis on
America‘s moral character, the image of the United States is projected as a predominately
credible good willed force that can provide nothing but ―progress, prosperity, and peace‖ for
everyone in the world (27).
The NSPDSC focuses on how government officials and departments need to use rhetoric
that works to persuade the audience not only of America‘s credibility but also we seek similar
goals as Muslims such as ―freedom,‖ ―dignity,‖ and ―hope for a better life‖ (3). The action plan
detailed in Attachment A for the first strategic objective further focuses on ethos with the goal to
―reinforce a positive vision of hope and opportunity,‖ thus showing how to enhance the U.S.‘s
ability to create identification through our good moral character (13). This section addresses the
need for departments implementing the plan to ―seek opportunities to link programs and policies
with America‘s values,‖ that specifically ―spotlight ways in which American assistance is
helping real people achieve better lives; collect and share success stories‖ (13–14). This
objective emphasizes the need to promote the positive acts of Americans in order to foster
goodwill towards the U.S. It also aims to illustrate the need to communicate to foreign audiences
that the United States not only can be trusted but is forefront throughout the world in helping
people in need. By communicating through claims about national ethos in an effort to establish
identification, this rhetoric can mobilize others around commonalities for ―America has long
been a beacon of hope and opportunity for people across the world and [represents] that beacon
of hope for a better life‖ (3). As I have demonstrated, the NSPDSC‘s emphasis on the rhetorical
use of ethos is useful in persuading others that one can be trusted on goodwill and further allows
for the audience to identify with the rhetor of a particular opinion. Like ethos enhancement, the
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focus on finding substance or a common ground is an additional component addressed in order to
persuade the audience to rhetorically identify with us.
Finding Substance or Common Ground
The NSPDSC relies heavily on creating identification through the emphasis on a common
substance. Burke explains that it is because no one is ―wholly and truly of one substance,‖ that
we use rhetoric to create identification, and why ―two persons may be identified in terms of some
principle they share in common, an ‗identification‘ that does not deny their distinctiveness‖
(Rhetoric of Motives 21-22). Therefore, this commonality that identifies one with another allows
two persons to be ―consubstantial‖ and unique at the same time (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 21).
Cheney describes this strategy of identification as ―the common ground technique [...] where the
rhetor equates or links himself or herself with others in an overt manner‖ (148). Thus, using this
rhetoric assumes that a substance exists which makes these two groups consubstantial. As the
NSPDSC dictates, we need to ―promote linkages between the American people and the rest of
the world by reminding diverse populations of our common interests and values‖ (12). It is these
linkages of substance—or in this case common values or interests—that allow identification to
happen.
These ―fundamental values‖ are the substance that we use to create common ground with
our targeted audience (2). The NSPDSC broadly defines these substances as ―common interests
and values‖ that allow for ―progress, prosperity and peace around the world‖ (3). The rhetoric
surrounding common substances is somewhat vague, which is useful because it allows for
individual interpretation that in turn promotes greater identification with an audience. And even
if there are only a few substances that join the two groups together, identification works when a
group is persuaded that commonalities do exist between each group.
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One of the most prominent common substances that the NSPDSC relies upon to create
identification is the emphasis on the one characteristic that people of all nations share: humanity.
The reliance on the shared interest of humanity is useful in public diplomacy because as the
NSPDSC explains ―far more unites us as human beings than divides us‖ (3). Therefore, if there is
no other characteristic that bonds us with one another, ultimately we are joined by our common
will to survive as human beings. In using language that focuses on this greater shared interest of
humanity, the NSPDSC consequentially addresses other ―common threats‖ to the world at large
and human survival (3). By addressing our common quest for human survival, the possible
threats to human livelihood become apparent. For example, the NSPDSC elucidates that our
shared interests as human beings are ―expanding economic opportunity, promoting peaceful
resolution of conflicts, enhancing scientific collaboration, fighting diseases that respect no
border, and protecting our common environment‖ (3). By highlighting these aspects of humanity
that are critical to the quality of life, the possible fleeting nature and threat to humans becomes
figural in creating a conducive situation for identification to take place.
As discussed earlier, although identification is elicited based on these ―common interests
and values,‖ it results in two groups as ―consubstantial‖ without dismissing certain differences.
We may be divided by varying aspects such as geography, politics, religion, and ways of life,
even though linkages are created through ―common interests and values between Americans and
peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths across the world‖ (3). This emphasis on
commonalities while simultaneously acknowledging a country‘s individual characteristics is
relevant because it rhetorically serves to encourage further identification with U.S. public
diplomacy goals. In what follows I will further address the NSPDSC plan‘s focus on common
interests and values by examining the action plan in its attempt to reach these goals.
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Attachment A, part three, in the NSPDSC provides a more detailed action plan pertaining
to the third strategic goal, ―Nurture and Project Common Interests and Values‖ (22). Similar to
the previous examples of the creation of identification through commonalities, this action plan
pinpoints useful places to create bonds with our targeted audience and provides hypothetical
examples of how this approach can be effective. The action plan is composed of five
components:
1. Each agency should identify and build on areas in which their expertise/mandate
corresponds with a common interest of the world.
2. Develop active, agency-specific alumni networks of current and former official guests,
speakers, professional exchanges and study programs as resources for outreach.
3. Greater focus should be placed on three major areas that human beings across the
world care most about: health, education and economic opportunity.
4. Expand private sector linkages.
5. Sharing the best of American culture mitigates negative images and
misunderstanding (22–24).
These components outline the importance in emphasizing the ―common interest of the
world‖ and the need to work with others as partners (22). Some of the components provide
examples, such as climate/environment issues that affect all of the world‘s people. By
constructing messages that seek to build relationships around a greater common interest, we can
see where identification can take place. For example, the second, third, and forth components of
this action plan are constructed with a focus on commonalities that we share with our targeted
audience in order to cultivate bonds surrounding issues such as health and economics. By
highlighting such crucial issues that people of all nationalities face, it becomes easier to persuade
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the target audience to identify with us for these issues and challenges are framed to emphasize
how they are relevant to all people
The fifth component draws specific attention to the U.S.‘s poor image in the Middle East.
It stresses the need to use all aspects of American culture that could provide useful in the
identification process with Muslims. Even if we don‘t share commonalities in cultural aspects,
we must use any aspects, such as ―sports activities to forge a common bond‖ or emphasize how
the arts are a ―shared language‖ that can help ―bridge political and policy differences‖ therefore
reminding ―us of our common humanity‖ (24). The use of these common interests gives the
United States a way to reach this target audience, for if ―U.S. science and technology are widely
respected in the Muslim world,‖ we have gained ―a promising entry point for engaging citizens
and society‖ (24). Once we are able to engage the audience through this focus on various
commonalities, the process of identification is able to work. The reliance in American public
diplomacy rhetoric on creating ―common interests or values‖ or what Burke would call a shared
―substance‖ continues to be used in creating identification with targeted audiences. Like past
American public diplomacy efforts, the NSPDSC works to incite identification most specifically
on the commonality of a shared humanity and the components surrounding it.
Joined but Simultaneously Separated
When identification takes place over a shared or common substance, this bond does not
dismiss the fact that each is ―unique,‖ because they become ―both joined and separate‖ (Burke,
Rhetoric of Motives 21). As Burke suggests, one can be both joined and distinct because ―to
begin with ‗identification‘ is [...] to confront the implications of division‖ (Rhetoric of Motives
22). Identification is not relevant in efforts of public diplomacy unless some kind of division
exists. Therefore, it is only through division, or each one‘s uniqueness, that identification can be
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―affirmed with earnestness‖ (Burke, Rhetoric of Motives 22). As Burke further explains, if we
―were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their
unity‖ and this could only be if we ―were wholly and truly of one substance‖ (Rhetoric of
Motives 22). Thus, identification works to create unification while also maintaining the
individuality of the people who are identifying with the rhetor.
The NSPDSC acknowledges that although we share many common interests and values
with people around the world, America and other nations are distinct and no single nation or
people are entirely identical. The fact that we are a ―multicultural nation‖ that ―respects people of
different cultures, backgrounds and faiths‖ makes it more likely others will identify with us (3).
By drawing attention to the fact that we value diversity and our society comprises such differing
people, works to create identification because the audience becomes included in our diversity.
Emphasizing the uniqueness of varying nations works to establish the idea that we are all equal,
distinct nations who can unite together. By stressing that the U.S. is representative of diversity
and respects all people despite our differences, automatically establishes respect for the targeted
audience and works to further the identification process.
Although the NSPDSC acknowledges people‘s unique attributes, it does so to reiterate
the primary goal of creating alliances. The NSPDSC explains that the U.S. is not only willing to
―be a partner for progress, prosperity and peace around the world‖ but also possesses the
fundamental values to head such actions (3). Therefore, despite these differences, America seeks
to be forefront in helping all people to maintain individuality as they seek ―prosperity and peace‖
(3). This establishes the U.S. as leading the ultimate quest for people of all faiths and ways of life
to achieve these goals.
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The NSPDSC states that, in order to ensure each nation‘s distinctiveness, the U.S. will
promote ―platforms where divergent ideas are encouraged and freely and openly debated‖ (25),
thus, establishing the U.S.‘s greater commitment to support the ―deep belief in freedom, and the
dignity and equality of every person‖ (3). This statement emphasizes the need for government
officials and departments to advocate such rhetoric in order to persuade the target audience that
the overall goal of U.S. diplomacy is not solely to achieve specific policy goals but to further the
interests and the greater good of all people in the world. Therefore, stating all people‘s ideas are
welcomed and every person deserves to be treated equally allows for greater identification
because the U.S. is characterized as embracing all people.
Ultimately through this process of identification, the U.S. is not asking people to give up
their ―culture, background [or] faith‖ but rather to become involved in the greater quest for ―a
better life for all of the world‘s citizens‖ (3). Using language like ―world citizens‖ provides a
greater possibility for persuading others to identify with us because the U.S. is characterized as a
non-hegemonic entity where ―the United States Government seeks to partner with nations and
peoples across the world‖ to improve all lives (3). Therefore Americans are established foremost
as concerned world citizens that want to improve the world for all people. Persuading others to
identify with the U.S. in this partnership consequentially leads to the conclusion that Muslims are
identifying not only with Americans but all nations around the world who seek an improved
quality of life for all people.
Although the NSPDSC places much focus on world citizens working together, the
document simultaneously emphasizes the importance in communicating that all people can be
united yet distinct stating, ―We believe all individuals, men and women, are equal and entitled to
basic human rights, including freedom of speech, worship and political persuasion. While the
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form of government will vary, we believe all people deserve to live in just societies that protect
individual and common rights, fight corruption and are governed by the rule of law‖ (2). This
statement advances the belief that it is necessary for nations and individuals to maintain their
autonomy while working towards common goals and against threats. As discussed earlier, with
identification we see ―implied in it at every turn, its ironic counterpart: division‖ (Burke,
Rhetoric of Motives 23). Thus, for the U.S. to reach its public diplomacy goals through the
process of identification, a strong emphasis on shared interests and commonalities works because
when ―people are divided from each other [we] must use language, or rhetoric, to promote
identification or overcome division‖ (Jasinski 305). To overcome this division, identification
appeals to the commonalities between A and B. The NSPDSC promotes identification as a
means to Americans ―‗waging peace,‘ working to bring about conditions that lead to a better life
for people across the world and mak[ing] it more difficult for extremism to take root‖ (12). In
creating identification with the common goal of worldwide peace, the NSPDSC elicits the
question of the other that we are uniting against which leads to identifying and constructing the
enemy.
As I have shown, the NSPDSC evokes the rhetorical process of identification through
such appeals to ethos, common substance, and the ability to be both joined and separated as a
means of advancing U.S. political goals. Although each of these components of identification is
significant within the NSPDSC, arguably the most salient corresponding component within
identification is enemy construction or defining the ‗other.‘ In the post 9/11 world and the War
on Terror, the use of identification has served as a way we unify against the common enemy. In
the following section, I will turn to address how the enemy is constructed within the NSPDSC
and specifically to the War on Terror.

77
Enemy Construction
The NSPDSC relies upon enemy construction as yet another strategy to create
identification. A substantial amount of the plan focuses on methods to counter ―violent
extremists‖ and messages we need to send in reference to the War on Terror. The use of
―identification through antithesis,‖ Cheney suggests, is extremely effective, because it gives us a
―common enemy‖ to organize against (148). The rhetoric of enemy construction can be
persuasive because, as Burke describes, ―men who can unite on nothing else can unite on the
basis of a foe shared by all‖ (―The Rhetoric‖ 209). The NSPDSC‘s focus on a common enemy
was emphasized because it allows identification to happen even if identification cannot be
created through other common interests. In the current political context, the threat of terrorism
has become the ultimate foe and constitutes the common ‗other‘ that people throughout the world
can unite against for the greater good.
Enemies can be described as ―identifiable persons or stereotypes of persons to whom evil
traits, intentions, or actions can be attributed‖ (Edelman 87). As Edelman indicates, ―enemy
construction typically grows from [...] anxieties of the present‖ (88). Therefore, it is during times
of crisis, or in anxieties like in the post-9/11 world, that enemy construction becomes prevalent.
And as we see with the NSPDSC, which was produced out of the anxiety of terrorist threats and
a weakened U.S. image in the Middle East, our reliance on constructing the enemy has become
important in creating identification. In this section, I will briefly revisit the elements of rhetorical
enemy construction in relation to identification and analyze its use in the NSPDSC.
Victim/Savior
Rhetoric surrounding enemy construction often establishes a victim/savior relationship.
By defining the enemy ―as evil automatically establishes oneself as virtuous,‖ which further
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identifies the savior ―as emerging from an innocent past and as destined to help bring about a
brighter future world cleansed of the contamination the enemy embodies‖ (Edelman 76). In this
relationship, the savior is characterized as an ―innocent hero‖ without any inhumane or unethical
history and a heroic force fighting against the evil enemy to create a better world for everyone
(Edelman 76). As we see within the NSPDSC, the construction of the violent extremists or the
enemy of al Qaeda reveals the United States as the savior, while the primary victims of this
enemy are Muslims, because ―most of [al Qaeda‘s] victims have been fellow Muslims [who]
pervert Islam by advocating the mass murder of innocents‖ (28). The portrayal of Muslims this
way provides an opportunity to reinforce the idea that the U.S.‘s role is the virtuous savior
fighting the enemy, and further instills fear in the audience because Muslims become the
ultimate victims of these evil ‗others.‘ Despite the fact that extremists are ―fellow Muslims,‖ the
NSPDSC emphasizes that what extremists primarily seek is a world of violence by their
distortion of Islam. Communicating this victim/savior relationship allows identification against
the common enemy and ensures the moral place the U.S. holds in relation to extremists.
Regardless of any commonalities Muslims may share with violent extremists, these
Muslim extremists are characterized as the epitome of an evil enemy because as the NSPDSC
states ―their agenda is to impose a Taliban-like regime on the many proud and sovereign nations
of the Islamic world, and they have nothing but intolerance for all those who do not share their
extremist beliefs—including fellow Muslims‖ (28). Defining the extremist threats as intolerant
terrorists towards Muslim way of life establishes the enemy as a harboring threat to all people in
the Middle East, thus giving them only two options, to identify and seek help from the savior or
be taken over by the evil ‗other.‘ This polarizing language establishes a binary dilemma where
Muslims must either join the U.S. in fighting extremists or succumb to the violent ills of
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extremists. Characterizing these two options at such extremes gives further evidence that
Muslims should identify with the U.S. against extremists.
This rhetoric further solidifies the victim/savior relationship by associating the enemy as
a threat to all Muslims way of life, and asserts that the U.S. seeks to protect, nurture, and help
Muslims worldwide live in peace. The NSPDSC stresses one of the primary goals of extremists
is to take over all Islamic nations and further extend their oppressive ideology across the world
by mobilizing Muslims worldwide to join in their violent regime. Thus, the premier victims of
violent extremists are Muslims both in the Middle East and throughout the world. As Edelman
suggests, defining the evil other or in this situation, extremists, automatically depicts the hero
that will save these innocent victims from this threat and bring peace to their world (86).
Encouraging Action
In the case of the NSPDSC, identifying with the savior serves as a persuasive means of
reaching particular goals, such as getting the Muslim world to support the U.S. in the fight
against extremism. The NSPDSC explains that the kind of society the extremists seek for the
Muslim world resembles the one in Afghanistan, where ―freedom of expression and worship
[are] not allowed‖ (21). As Edelman suggests, ―communication about enemies exemplifies the
performative nature of language [and that] language is manifestly a form of action, not a tool for
describing a situation‖ (88). Therefore, these rhetorical choices used to construct and describe
the enemy in the NSPDSC works to elicit Muslims to act by identifying against the extremists.
The purpose of using this language is not necessarily to provide an accurate description
of the enemy based on evidence. Instead, the language serves a ―performative nature‖ by
ultimately inundating one with fear and persuading them to take a specific action (Edelman 88).
This action can vary to either elicit another to identify with a particular opinion or persuasion or
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take a physical action. Edelman describes how language surrounding enemy construction does
more than characterize the enemy; it serves as a warrant for some kind of action (88).
The NSPDSC describes the extremists as such an extreme threat to Muslims this helps
move the audience to action through identification with the emphasis on how extremists threaten
the freedoms of the Muslim world. By persuading Muslims to identify with us against the violent
extremists, we are able to create what Kertzer describes as ―solidarity without consensus‖—
although we may share a common enemy and interests, we don‘t share concordance on
everything (67–69). Therefore by creating solidarity, we are able to persuade Muslims to unite
and identify with the U.S. in the greater fight against extremism regardless of cultural and
ideological differences.
Uniting Against a Common Enemy while Maintaining Differences
Although one of the main themes in constructing the rhetorical enemy is uniting and
identifying against the common ―other,‖ emphasis on this theme can be problematic because it
often erases any ―differences among the people labeled the enemy‖ (Edelman 77). This step
often results in the enemy being constituted by a single characteristic, such as ―a common color,
religion, ideology, or nationality,‖ which leads to gross generalizations and stereotypes (Edelman
77). The NSPDSC addresses this danger by explaining in its General Communication Guidelines
(Attachment B) that we must ―use caution when dealing with faith issues in the public sphere‖
because pinpointing extremists by one sole characteristic can result in the dangerously inaccurate
idea that all Muslims are extremists (25). This characterization is problematic because by
drawing attention to a single characteristic of extremists, and in this case their Islamic faith, it
erases all of differences between extremists and other Muslims. The NSPDSC explains that when
communicating with the Muslim world, ―government officials should be extremely cautious and
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if possible, avoid using religious language, because it can mean different things and is easily
misconstrued,‖ then it clarifies that extremists are ―murderers who pervert religion, members of a
cult that promotes death and destruction rather than legitimate practitioners of any faith‖ (25).
Avoiding language about religion is necessary when defining the enemy because through this
rhetoric, the United States could easily be seen as anti-Muslim, which in turn not only hurts our
ability to get Muslims to identify with our cause but negatively impacts our over-all public
diplomacy goals in the Middle East.
Distinguishing between Muslim extremists and Muslim people as a whole is essential.
Following the 9/11 attacks the U.S. continued to engage in activities and rhetoric that assumed
all Muslims were extremists (Moore ―Post 9/11‖). By continuing down this path of fallacious
arguments—that these particular extremists were Muslims, all Muslims must be extremists—we
do ourselves a disservice. As history has shown us, extremism does not stem from a particular
religion. Rather, it can be found in all communities and faiths. Therefore, it becomes even more
important to use targeted rhetoric to clarify the distinction between the small percentage of
Muslim extremists and remaining Muslims. The NSPDSC states that it is absolutely imperative
in our communication to ―avoid phrases such as the ‗Muslim community‘ that imply it is
monolithic [since] Muslim communities, like other faith communities, are diverse‖ (25). These
kinds of distinctions are important because as the U.S. works to persuade Muslims, assuming all
people of the Islamic faith are identical makes it difficult for communication to take place. The
U.S. needs to understand that people practicing Islam are as heterogeneous as the Christian and
Jewish faiths.
To further avoid the lumping of all Muslims into the single enemy, the plan suggests that
when we need to ―make a point that involves Islam,‖ we must ―quote Muslim voices themselves‖
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(25). This distinction reiterates that only a small population practicing Islam are ―violent
extremists,‖ and we should draw specific attention to Muslim voices because they can be the
most influential in fighting this common enemy. Highlighting the role of influential Muslims
builds on how people of Islamic nations are more likely to respond and be persuaded by Muslims
voices for these individuals are crucial in countering extremism.
The focus on identifying Muslim voices as a means to enhance our message serves to
further encourage solidarity with U.S. efforts and help the U.S. reach its public diplomacy goals
in the Middle East. As the NSPDSC explains, it is important that the U.S. ―empower/highlight
Muslim voices that speak out against terror and violence, even when they do not agree with
every aspect of U.S. foreign policy‖ (25). This text highlights the political reality that the U.S.
and Muslims in the Middle East do not agree on many of the same policies. However, the greater
goal of both people is to fight the evil actions of the extremists. The process of seeking out
Muslim voices to support our goals is useful because particular Muslim voices have a greater
influence in creating identification and denouncing extremists than the U.S. ever could. The
focus on influential Muslims as a means to reaching our public diplomacy goals allows the U.S.
to reach a larger audience, thus creating greater identification against the enemy.
Despite our differences, ultimately the number one substance we share is the common
enemy of violent extremists who threaten the faith and culture of all people worldwide—
Americans and Muslims alike. Given the problem the U.S. faces of grouping all Muslims
together as extremists the NSPDSC identifies specific ways to communicate with the Muslim
audience in defining the extremists. In the next section, I will analyze the action plan on how to
Isolate and Undermine Violent Extremists, which further exemplifies the use of enemy
construction in the NSPDSC.
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Isolate and Undermine Violent Extremists
The second strategic objective of the NSPDSC states that U.S. government officials
should rely on the various interconnected components of enemy construction in order to
persuade our target audience to identify with us. The five page action plan for this objective
entitled, ―Isolate and Undermine Violent Extremists‖ is further detailed in Attachment A, which
includes six main components:
1. Place strategic focus on critical countries in the ideological war against terror.
2. Identify and engage key influencers whose views have a ripple effect throughout
society.
3. Undermine violent extremism by fostering a climate of openness and respect for
religious diversity.
4. Foster grassroots worldwide condemnation against terror; make suicide bombing a
matter of shame, not honor.
5. Focus on the type of ideology and society the extremists want to impose on others
throughout the world, especially Islamic nations and confront hate speech (17–21).
The first component seeks to counter the terrorists or enemies by focusing on critical
countries and specifically the ideological differences between extremists by ―undermin[ing]
support for terrorism‖ (17). In targeting the specific Muslim countries that are deemed ―critical‖
and at a greater risk of being persuaded by extremists, it became essential to create identification
through the use of enemy construction to effectively undermine beliefs of violent extremists. By
constituting the fight against terror and the extremists as ―ideological,‖ this rhetoric works to
persuade critical Muslim countries that these extremists seek to create a world that not only
distorts their religion but also fosters a community of fear and violence. In addition, this rhetoric
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automatically defines the War on Terror as composed of only two opposing ideologies, therefore
reinforcing the belief that identifying with Americans is the only way to counter extremists‘
ideology and actions.
The second component specifically states the need to ―identify and engage key
influencers‖ in such a way that they ―speak out against the extremists,‖ thus amplifying the
enemy as evil and as a threat to humanity (17). This action plan specifies certain people who can
speak out against extremism, such as religious leaders, youth, women and girls, and members of
minority groups. In order to encourage the world to fight these extremists, we need influential
voices of all ages, classes, and groups to denounce terrorist efforts. The role these influential
voices can play in helping to characterize the extremist threat is vital because, in order to reach
our goals, support must come from all sections of the Muslim community. This component
serves to further illustrate how the violent extremists are divided from the majority of the world‘s
people.
The third component in this section discusses how further identification between
Muslims and Americans can work to not only solidify the enemy but serves as a ―‗bridge‘
between American and Muslim communities worldwide‖ (19). This bridge is significant because
the extremists‘ threat is no longer seen as a danger only to people in the Middle East, but a
worldwide threat to the faith of Muslims everywhere. By creating alliances and uniting with
Americans against the evil extremists, Muslims can help in fighting extremism, and help
promote a greater understanding and respect for religious diversity worldwide.
The fourth component describes how the U.S. must not be the only nation fighting terror.
We must ―foster grassroots worldwide condemnation against terror‖ (20). This component
stresses the need to encourage more people in the world to identify with our fight against
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terrorism and also serves as a way to reinforce our construction of this enemy. For example, the
plan states that in order to denounce terror worldwide, we must ―highlight the human cost of
terror‖ and the gravity of such violence in order to ―remind audiences that the victims of terror
are often innocent children and women [that] come from more than 90 nations and many of them
are Muslims‖ (20). Emphasizing that the ―violent extremists‖ primarily target individuals of the
Muslim faith, most specifically children and women, works to instill fear within the NSPDSC‘s
targeted audience, leading Muslims to identify with our cause. Stressing that governmental
officials and departments communicate through this rhetoric can also work to amplify and extend
the threat of extremists because it reiterates that all Muslims are innocent victims of these
extremists regardless of what country you live in. Terror by extremists has become a pervasive
evil that no one can escape. In rhetorically constructing the ―violent extremists‖ who engage in
terror not only identifies them as the evil ‗other‘ but also frames them as the most critical threat
to Muslims everywhere, particularly innocent women and children. The use of this language
presents a frightening picture of the future and is further reiterated in the fifth component of this
section.
The fifth component explains that the focus of public diplomacy efforts must continue to
address how extremists threaten the ideology of societies worldwide, ―especially Islamic
nations‖ (21). The NSPDSC explains that the ultimate goal of these violent extremists is ―to
create and impose a unified, dictatorial state on the proud and currently sovereign nations of the
diverse Islamic world‖ (21). Therefore, the violent extremists target people worldwide; however
the primary targets are ultimately people in the Middle East.
The attached text regarding the action plan on how to ―Isolate and Undermine Violent
Extremists‖ provides a useful inquiry into how the NSPDSC engages the rhetoric of enemy
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construction and elicits identification with Muslims to further reach the U.S.‘s public diplomacy
goals. As we have seen throughout the NSPDSC, the focus on enemy construction is essential in
order to achieve these objectives. Using this same framework, I will next analyze another
attachment specifically detailing the War on Terror.
Messages Specific to the War on Terror
A major focus on the rhetorical construction of the enemy reveals itself in three pages at
the end of the NSPDSC entitled, ―Core Messages-Specific to the War on Terror.‖ Although there
are many instances throughout the document that make reference to the enemy as sources of
―ideologies of hate and oppression‖ that ―threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized
people of every nation, culture and faith,‖ the final section of the plan details specific messages
that should be used in regards to the War on Terror (2–3). As previously described, the mission,
priorities, and strategic objectives of the NSPDSC emphasize the need for ―peace around the
world‖ and define the evil enemy as ―violent extremists‖ (3). However, these core messages
require more direct attention and analysis because they specifically highlight the rhetoric the
U.S. should use when engaging the primary audience for the communication plan in order to
encourage all Muslims to identify with our fight in the War on Terror.
Evoking Ideology
This detailed section of the NSPDSC describes how the enemy performs a political
function, because ―to name specific enemies is to evoke specific ideologies‖ (Edelman 82). As a
result, when people identify their enemy, it reveals how they identify themselves in relation to
other political ideologies (Edelman 82). Thus, when we encourage the Muslim audience to
identify with us against ―violent extremists‖ in the War on Terror, this identification serves to
persuade them of American‘s particular political ideology—democracy. The enemy is not only
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characterized as an evil force, but also as one who seeks to impose a restrictive and ―uniform
ideology‖ in the world, whereas the U.S. seeks to encourage peace and diversity (Ivie, ―Images‖
287). Robert Ivie describes how this kind of rhetoric creates an image of America that
symbolizes the ―ideology of liberty and equality for everyone‖ where ―Americanism is for
everyone, and everyone is a potential American‖ (Democracy 123). America becomes
representative of a moral people who will lead all people to ―salvation from the blighted world of
turmoil and tyranny to a democratic promised land of peace and freedom‖ (Ivie, Democracy
125). As I discussed earlier, the U.S. becomes characterized as the savior to powerless victims of
extremists worldwide by providing people opportunities to reach the political ideals of American
democracy.
The construction of America in this way further defines these barbaric ‗others‘ as a threat
who ―prevent the civilizing influence of democratic enlightenment‖ (Ivie, Democracy 149).
Accordingly, the evil ‗other‘ or extremists are represented as the sole reason that Muslims are
unable to live in a community with freedom and equality or reach the quality of life they deserve.
Ivie suggests that the U.S. has repeatedly relied on these rhetorical constructions and how ―the
images of the savagery of the Other and corresponding fragility of civilized institutions of
freedom, democracy, reason, law, and order has been America‘s traditional motive for war and
ideological incentive for imposing its version of democracy on an unwilling world‖ (Ivie,
Democracy 31). Defining the evil savages as a threat to a civilized world serves to persuade
Muslims to identify with us when they normally would not choose to do so. These core messages
address how ―violent extremists‖ who are characterized as uncivilized, remain a threat to people
worldwide with the ultimate goal to kill innocent people that seek a life with democratic ideals.
To further distinguish the ideological differences between this ‗other‘ and civilized
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people, the NSPDSC describes each scenario. This section of the NSPDSC specifically outlines
the disparities between extremist goals and democratic or civilized ideals. As the NSPDSC
states:
The difference between democratic values and the type of society that the violent
extremists want is stark:
 Freedom vs. tyranny
 Tolerance and respect for differences vs. intolerance for any diversity
 Religious freedom vs. state-imposed requirements of worship
 Freedom of speech vs. imprisonment for differing views
 Freedom to associate vs. restrictions on leaving your home
 Education for all vs. no education for girls, limited education for boys
 Accountable governments with citizen participation vs. un-elected, selfdeclared leaders. (29)
In this quotation, we can see that the political ideology of democracy used in opposition
to the kind of society the ―violent extremists‖ seek, reestablishes the ―us‖ versus ―them‖ binary
and leaves no room for any other kind of political ideology. When communicating these
differences the audience is only given the choice of identifying with the U.S. and our political
ideology of democracy or identifying with what the violent extremists seek. Our democratic
ideology is turned into a universal ideology that all people in the world seek because the
characteristics of this democratic ideology become associated with civilized people.
To emphasize our political ideology even further, the NSPDSC explains the importance
of stressing the following:
The fight against terrorism is a concerted fight for values and principles that are
universal. Much more unites us as citizens of the world than divides us. Across all
borders, we share a common humanity. While the color of our skin, the language we
speak, or the way we worship may be different, people everywhere aspire to speak their
minds, participate in their society, worship freely, live in security, and pursue education,
jobs and greater opportunities for their families (29).

In this quotation, we see how the NSPDSC seeks to extend the political ideology of
democracy as a fight for universal values and principles insisting that despite varying differences
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in ―race, ethnicity or religion,‖ we are united by the ―violent extremists‖ who possess ―contempt
for human life‖ (28). Using the words ―universal‖ and ―common humanity‖ establishes that all
people of the world seek the political ideology of the U.S.—democracy.
The rhetorical construction of the enemy in this way persuades Muslims to identify with
our political ideology of democracy and serves to define the U.S. as unable to do harm,
establishing us as leaders against the enemy. Not only does this rhetoric explain that the only
alternative to extremist ideology is our version of democracy, but it also describes how
Americans can deliver Muslims freedom from these evil extremists. For example, the NSPDSC
explains how ―despite al Qaeda‘s repeated attempts to characterize the world as being in the
midst of a clash of civilizations [...] the international community—east and west, north and
south—has come together in unprecedented ways to confront common threats and ease human
suffering‖ and insists that ―America is doing its part, working in partnership with countries
throughout the Islamic world to improve the lives of Muslims‖ (29). These quotations serve to
establish the common identity that people throughout the world share while emphasizing the
leadership role the U.S. plays in the War on Terror, which is not just positive but crucial in
improving Muslim lives. By claiming that the U.S. is an essential player in bringing peace to the
world, this rhetoric proves more useful in persuading the target audience by reinforcing the idea
that America‘s sole goal is to help save humanity.
The NSPDSC dismisses al Qaeda‘s theory that the world is in a ―clash of civilizations,‖
which serves to further distinguish that the ideological fight is not between two varying political
ideologies. Instead, the fight is between the ―violent extremists‖ and all civilized peoples of the
world. The War on Terror consists of the ―international‖ and ―interfaith‖ communities who are
against ―the ideology of violent extremists [who use] perverted religiosity to attempt to justify
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murder, terror and violence‖ (29). This rhetoric draws attention to the fact that although these
extremists may try to define this fight against varying civilizations or people of different cultures
or faiths, this claim is inaccurate because these extremists pose a threat to all of humanity
through their distortion of the Islamic religion.
Rhetorical ‘Othering’
The NSPDSC emphasizes that in order to further persuade Muslim audiences to identify
with the U.S., we must stress that the U.S.‘s current engagement with the Muslim world is not
merely a result of the attacks on 9/11. Instead, Americans are genuinely concerned for the state
of all Muslims as well as all civilized peoples. The NSPDSC attempts to encourage
communication aimed at persuading Muslims that our efforts are not about seeking revenge for
9/11, but our greater concern is the threat of terrorism worldwide. By convincing Muslims that
we are working in conjunction with them instead of against them, this approach serves to
reestablish the binary of ―us‖ and ―them‖ in the War on Terror.
The use of the phrase ―civilized people‖ in opposition to the enemy contributes to the
enemy being constructed as barbaric and savage-like. Ivie describes how this rhetorical
‗othering‘ ―entails a set of contrasts between the threatening Other‘s irrational appetites and
America‘s rational commitment to law, reason, and civilized order; between the brutal Other‘s
affinity for coercion, force, and violence and America‘s steadfast regard for freedom, liberty and
peace; and between the hostile Other‘s willful acts of aggression and America‘s reluctant acts of
self-defense against unprovoked attacks on the civilized world‖ (Democracy 46). By using this
rhetoric, moral attributes become associated with the savage ‗other‘ verses ‗civilized‘ people
which works to reiterate the clear distinction between us versus them. In employing this value
laden language works in creating more opportunities for identification against the other because
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the enemy threatens every element of human life. Thus, the audience not only begins to see these
extremists as a violent threat but a monstrous manifestation that has no regard for humankind.
The NSPDSC describes how the violent extremists possess ―contempt for human life‖
which inherently results in the ‗other‘ seen as ―irrational, coercive [...] a barbarian [...] a criminal
mind, a mentally disturbed or crazed adversary, a fanatic, an ideologue, and a satanic figure or
profane instrument of evil‖ (Ivie, Democracy 46). The evil enemy then becomes morphed into
the most threatening enemy known to all of humankind. Establishing the enemy as having no
regard for life establishes a greater fear of this unpredictable ‗other‘ that no person would ever
consider their cause as legitimate. In contrast, the victimized or civilized peoples become defined
as a symbol of freedom that is ―vulnerable and fragile‖ and the ultimate prey of this evil other
(Ivie, Democracy 46).
The NSPDSC also employs the emphasis on shared humanity which is what Ivie
describes as ―strategies of identification that address the Other, [and use] rhetorical discourse
[that] bridges divisions without suppressing differences‖ (Democracy 42). As I have shown
earlier this discourse within the NSPDSC works to elicit identification against the evil enemy in
the fight for a peaceful world. This rhetoric serves to persuade the audience that the U.S.‘s
―mission is to uplift humanity‖ by working to rid the world of barbaric extremists (Ivie,
Democracy 125). Establishing the U.S. as the peaceful savior allows the audience to be more
easily persuaded on other particular issues when they believe they are joining a fight for
humanity and civilized people everywhere.
The continued use of the civilized versus barbaric binary is also used in relation to
religion. The fight against terror is no longer confined to a war between the violent extremists
and the U.S. but is described as a war between extremists and ―the majority of civilized people of
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all faiths‖ who reject acts of terror (28). The NSPDSC states that ―the struggle against violent
extremism should unite the nations and citizens of the world because terrorism threatens all the
communities of the world‖ (28). Focusing on the claim that extremists threaten members of all
faiths and all civilized people amplifies the danger and also re-characterizes who is fighting the
War on Terror. Therefore the extremists constitute a worldwide threat to all faiths and the U.S.‘s
War on Terror becomes seen as a global War on Terror.
The NSPDSC explains that, ―all major world faiths, including Islam, Christianity,
Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism teach that life is precious and that the taking of innocent life is
wrong‖ (28). By emphasizing that the world‘s five major religions are opposed to taking human
life, this rhetoric reiterates that these extremists symbolize evil for taking human life, while
simultaneously implying that we and all other major religious groups never take innocent lives
because ―murdering innocent people is always wrong‖ (29). Again, this rhetoric assumes the
major religious faiths have never taken innocent lives in the name of religion, which asserts
civilized people on a higher moral ground and gives further reason to unite against the
extremists.
The NSPDSC continues to reference worldwide religions to expand the idea that all
people of every faith must join the fight in the War on Terror, which elicits greater identification
because extremists threaten all people regardless of religion. The acts of the violent extremists
are described as bringing ―tragedy, destruction, death and terrible grief to innocent people from
Indonesia to Morocco, Spain to Jordan, England to India and Egypt,‖ which reiterates that the
innocent victims are differing peoples throughout the world (28). These savage ‗others‘ are
constructed as a destructive force to all people everywhere. They recognize no boundaries or
differences because they seek to target civilized people everywhere and threaten all of humanity.
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To further extend the concept that extremists do not exclude any people during terrorist
attacks, the NSPDSC states, ―The victims of September 11th were citizens of more than 90
different countries and adherents of many faiths, including Christianity, Judaism and Islam‖ (28).
This repeated focus on expanding the idea of who the ―violent extremists‖ are targeting—
innocent people of many different faiths—becomes more useful in creating identification against
the enemy because they sought to harm not just Americans on 9/11, but people from ―many
faiths‖ (28). Emphasizing that the victims of 9/11 were Americans of all faiths is important
because it stresses how extremists have no regard for any human beings in the world.
As I have previously shown, the NSPDSC not only characterizes violent extremists as a
threat to people worldwide, but also takes special care to stress how the cardinal victims of these
extremists are their fellow people in the Middle East and Muslims everywhere. Focusing on the
fact that the principal victims of extremists are Muslims is important because to be the primary
target of terrorism by your own people is a difficult reality; we all want to be able to depend on
our own communities. In this section, the NSPDSC continues to illustrate how Muslims are the
leading victims of these extremists. For example, attention is brought to how Muslims have been
victims of brutal extremists ―over the past several decades‖ (29). These ―cruelly calculated
terrorist murders‖ against Muslims have been carried out through such acts as ―bombings of a
wedding celebration in Jordan [...] and day laborers in Baghdad who were trying to earn money
to support their families‖ (29). Detailing specific terrorist acts like these reflects the violence and
brutality of the extremists and substantiates the threat they pose to Muslim lives. Drawing
attention to these specific acts of violence against Muslims personalizes and amplifies the threat
of extremists. It is this focus on the ―enemy and victim-savior‖ relationship that allows greater
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possibilities to persuade Muslims the U.S. is a ―virtuous‖ savior that can save them from the
brutalities of their own people (Edelman 76).
The plan continues, stating that to date ―the violent extremists have killed thousands of
Muslims‖ and that Muslims have been ―brutally repressed‖ by these extremists (29–30). By
emphasizing fellow Muslims as the predominant victims of these extremists, the U.S. is further
established as a savior and also provides an opportunity to reiterate that despite the terrorist acts
by violent extremists, America continues to work to better all Muslim lives which maintains that
the U.S. can provide safety, peace and prosperity.
To illustrate ways that the U.S. supports and provides a better life for Muslims, the
NSPDSC elaborates by naming the U.S. as the ―largest bilateral donor to the Palestinian people,‖
the ―largest provider of help to Muslims affected by the tsunami in Indonesia and the earthquake
in Pakistan,‖ and points out that we ―provide funds for Muslim girls and boys to go to school, for
Muslim women to learn English, and for Muslim young people to get training for jobs‖ (29). The
United States is portrayed as a savior through the NSPDSC‘s emphasis on these virtuous acts
towards the Muslim community. Americans serve as the antithesis of the enemy because ―we
seek to work in a spirit of partnership with people and nations across the world to confront this
ideology of hate and foster a climate of hope and opportunity‖ (29). Therefore, identification
with the U.S. in opposition to extremists not only elicits Muslims to share our common ideology
but also serves to inspire hope that our efforts against terrorism will deliver a world where they
will no longer be victim to brutal violence and can live in peace.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown how the NSPDSC plan constructed the enemy,
characterized the U.S. in opposition to the enemy, and described the victims of the enemy
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through rhetorical strategies of identification. The use of the process of identification through
ethos and especially enemy construction in the NSPDSC are reminiscent of previous public
diplomacy rhetoric. This plan, although considered ―new,‖ illustrates how the U.S. continues to
rely on rhetoric that uses the same tactics in creating commonalities while maintaining
differences and eliciting identification through the varying components of enemy construction.
My analysis of the NSPDSC examines how despite differing political contexts, the manner in
which we define the evil enemy in relation to ourselves continues to be unwavering. In addition,
in times of crisis we seek to inspire foreign publics through identification on the basis of our
political ideology of democracy, which we assume all people worldwide seek. As I will further
address in Chapter 4, using this rhetoric is problematic because it assumes that our concept of
democracy is the goal for all people in the world and is the only moral and ethical political
ideology for all of humanity.
Although the NSPDSC was not implemented in all sections of the U.S. government
before a new administration took over the White House, it foreshadows future diplomacy efforts
and provides a useful example we can learn from as we continue to craft American public
diplomacy rhetoric. In my concluding chapter, I will discuss problems and shortcomings within
the NSPDSC, how we must learn from past rhetorical processes in American public diplomacy
before we can move forward, and how rhetorical analysis is a useful lens in understanding public
diplomacy rhetoric as we continue to engage with foreign publics.
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Chapter 4:
Conclusion: Looking to the Future of American Public Diplomacy
I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your
mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal
administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the
freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. And
that is why we will support them everywhere.
President Barack Obama
The history of American public diplomacy provides an opportunity to see how rhetoric
has both helped the U.S. achieve its goals while simultaneously elucidating the grave failures of
past and current American diplomacy tactics. Public diplomacy is the way we seek to sway
worldwide public opinion and historically, how Americans have responded to crisis. Although
definitions of public diplomacy continue to be debated from propaganda to public and
international relations, public diplomacy can be broadly understood as how we communicate
with foreign audiences through various tactics. This overview into American public diplomacy is
important because it not only exposes a recurring rhetorical process, but helps Americans in
better understanding ourselves.
As public diplomacy again becomes a focus in American culture and to the executive
branch of government, the U.S. should change the way we communicate with foreign audiences
and break the rhetorical pattern that we have relied upon since our country‘s founding. Although
American public diplomacy‘s importance has wavered over the years it has remained a
fundamental practice within American politics. As the U.S. currently moves forward in its quest
to combat terrorism we should undertake public diplomacy through new methods and vigor to
ensure our efforts are not seen solely as a projection of hegemonic power. In order to do this we
must change the way Americans conduct public diplomacy with both new rhetoric and policy.
Although past rhetorical appeals to the process of identification, ethos and enemy construction
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may have worked at previous historical moments in winning over the hearts and minds of the
world. Scholars, public officials, and a variety of organizations suggest that the current tactics
the executive branch is employing no longer prove useful in today‘s world. Therefore, the U.S.
must adapt to the reality that our approach and assumptions may need some reworking.
In this project I first began by defining and contextualizing the current state of American
public diplomacy and the rejuvenation we have witnessed within public diplomacy in the post
9/11 world. The September 11, 2001 attacks and the U.S. declaration in the War on Terror all
contributed to the leading concern of how the Muslim world perceived the U.S. One scholar
describes that following these events, U.S. ―public diplomacy was second only to the military
offensive, and was the lead instrument in the battle for hearts and minds‖ (Zaharna 2). Thus,
public diplomacy can be extremely valuable in engaging foreign audiences. As I discussed in
Chapter 1, public diplomacy became essential within U.S. foreign policy, however, despite the
change in political context we continued to rely on similar rhetorical patterns of the past.
Next, I evaluated the history of American public diplomacy by applying the theoretical
lens of rhetorical history, in order to recognize public diplomacy as a perpetual process. Ball
explains that analyzing rhetoric this way allows us to comprehend how rhetoric is part of a
―historical conversation,‖ which can help to understand our past, present, and future. By tracing
the context of American public diplomacy efforts from our founding to the Iranian Hostage
Crisis of the Carter Administration illustrates the importance of rhetorical history in American
public diplomacy. In order to substantiate my argument I conducted a more detailed analysis of
the historical context surrounding the 1979 Iran Crisis which revealed how the communication
plan put forth by the Carter Administration is not an independent rhetorical manifestation of that
moment, but interconnected throughout history. This plan serves as a comparative historical
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artifact that exemplifies how we rely on the rhetorical process of identification and interrelated
appeals to ethos and enemy construction. Additionally, an analysis of the Carter
Administration‘s Communication plan with Muslim Countries shows that despite the plan‘s
rhetorical appeals to create commonalities, respect of Islam, enhance goodwill towards the U.S.,
and construct the evil enemy as the Soviets, it failed terribly. Although the Carter Administration
plan was unsuccessful in reaching its goals, the communication plan serves as a telling example
of how the U.S. continues to depend on similar rhetoric in our public diplomacy tactics during
times of crisis.
As I have argued in Chapter 3, the analysis of the Carter Administration‘s communication
plan is useful because it reveals significant parallels with the 2007 NSPDSC. Through the
application of the same theoretical concepts of the rhetorical process of identification, appeals to
ethos and enemy construction, I illustrate that despite very different political contexts
surrounding the 2007 NSPDSC and the first communication strategy ever created to influence all
sectors of government, the U.S. again uses similar rhetorical patterns to persuade foreign
audiences during crisis. In my analysis of the NSPDSC, rhetorical ethos is used as a means to
strengthen goodwill towards the U.S. by highlighting how the U.S. provides opportunities and
freedoms for all people. The plan also reveals a heightened focus on how the U.S.‘s ultimate
concern is humanity and the issues all people face such as environment, health and economic
concerns which works to encourage identification. As the NSPDSC seeks to elicit identification
over commonalities, it stresses that people can be both joined and separate thus maintaining
individuality while working together for a better world.
The most prominent finding in analyzing the NSPDSC was the strong emphasis on
constructing the other or enemy. The plan works by establishing a victim/savior relationship
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where the U.S. is the virtuous hero to save innocent Muslims from extremists. The U.S. is
constructed as moral in relation to the barbaric enemy that distorts Islam and threatens all of
humankind but most especially their fellow Muslims. This rhetoric is useful to encourage
Muslims to identify with the U.S. against extremists and create greater fear of Muslim
extremists. To further define the enemy the NSPDSC continues by rhetorically setting up an
ideological dichotomy between universal democracy and evil extremists situating the U.S. in the
leadership role of saving humanity. The majority of the rhetoric within the NSPDSC shows how
we continue to rely on similar rhetorical appeals and that changing political contexts have
minimal impact on our response to the world.
In this concluding chapter, I will briefly revisit the importance of the utility public
diplomacy rhetoric in U.S. history particularly in creating identification and the ways in which
the Carter document and NSPDSC are representative of this practice. I will then address the
possible problems/shortcomings of reiterating this rhetorical process in American public
diplomacy. Finally, I will highlight the importance of rhetorical analysis and communication in
public diplomacy scholarship. My analysis of both the Carter Administration‘s communication
plan and the 2007 NSPDSC reveal the persisting process of public diplomacy rhetoric in
America and how this provides us the opportunity to understand how we have historically
communicated with the world. This analysis also shows the important contribution that rhetorical
analysis can have in public diplomacy scholarship.
Remaking History
As we have seen, American public diplomacy is composed of more than a set of tactics in
approaching world opinion; it is a projection of the fundamental values upon which our nation
was created. This perpetual process in American public diplomacy reveals how our approach is
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produced by the executive branch from necessities of particular contexts often in the face of
crisis. We see how American public diplomacy proves itself as a ―social utility‖ and a reaction to
changing political environments or crisis in history. Approaching American public diplomacy
rhetoric this way allows us to understand how it is rooted in the past and a part of the greater
conversation of diplomacy which reflects the fundamental values and characteristics of the U.S.
This rhetoric reoccurs throughout history and is brought forth during times of crisis in
approaching foreign audiences.
An analysis of our present public diplomacy climate and the NSPDSC in the post 9/11
world illustrates this historical pattern and the present situation and challenges we face as we
move forward in crafting American public diplomacy rhetoric. Although the NSPDSC may be
considered a ―new‖ strategy in response to the events of 9/11, my evaluation shows how this
communication strategy is not an isolated and static product of this historical moment, but rather
intrinsically linked to past American public diplomacy. By understanding American public
diplomacy as part of an interrelated recurring rhetorical process, allows a more expansive view
into to current strategies like the 2007 NSPDSC.
The context following the 9/11 attacks resulted in some fundamental changes in how the
U.S. executive branch approaches public diplomacy. Since September 11, 2001 there has been a
rise in U.S. involvement and emphasis in public diplomacy both at the executive level and within
American society through such citizen diplomacy initiatives like Sister Cities International
(―About Us‖). Americans have witnessed changes at the executive level with the creation of the
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs position, increased focus on
broadcasting with Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra TV, and numerous other campaigns and initiatives
in order to persuade foreign audiences of American credibility and the fight against extremism.
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Although the definitions and offices of American public diplomacy have changed following
9/11, despite these political and technological changes, essentially our efforts have stayed the
same. We continue to rely on similar rhetoric that is most recently seen within the NSPDSC. The
NSPDSC illustrates how our means to an end have changed minimally since our nation‘s
inception and the reliance on this rhetoric needs altering to achieve our goals.
This examination of the unchanging process of American public diplomacy rhetoric since
its origin to our present exposes how this rhetoric may remain problematic in the world we face
today. An analysis of the ways the executive branch historically engages the world reveals how
the U.S. continues to communicate from an unrelenting ideological mindset that asserts our
democratic ideals as the only civilized way to live and results in an imbalanced power dynamic.
As the Obama Administration embarks on public diplomacy, new communication strategies must
be used, for our attempts at persuading the Muslim world have remained unsuccessful since 9/11.
In order to reach the Muslim world we need to replace ineffective tactics so the U.S. is no longer
perceived as a domineering hegemonic force and work on new rhetoric in conjunction with
policy that reflects all aspects of American society, both negative and positive.
Problems/Shortcomings with Recurring Rhetorical Process
Through this study on American public diplomacy and most specifically my analysis of
the 2007 NSPDSC, two important issues have become apparent that are particularly problematic
and should be addressed. My analysis of the 2007 NSPDSC in Chapter 3 not only shows our
continued reliance on the rhetorical process of identification, and appeals to ethos and enemy
construction, but further reveals the U.S.‘s assumption we have the same interests and values as
Muslims. It also highlights our dependence on one-way communication instead of working to
establish relationships based on shared communication and dialogue. Although we have sought
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to elicit identification with Muslims based on common substances or interests, these efforts have
failed to produce our desired outcome. Next, I will explore the possible problems of rhetorically
focusing on common values in our public diplomacy rhetoric.
Focus on Common Values
A significant concept within American public diplomacy is the continued stress on
emphasizing common values and interests with Muslims. As I have shown in my analysis of the
history of American public diplomacy, we have continually relied on creating identification by
emphasizing commonalities. The assumption that we share many of the same fundamental values
and interests is problematic when that may not entirely be true (van Ham 432). Instead of
working to embrace the fact that the U.S. may not share all of the same values as Muslims, we
continue to reiterate that extensive commonalities exist and assume American values are
universal. Focusing on key American values as the principal tactic to reach Muslims only proves
the U.S.‘s myopic outlook for engaging foreign audiences.
This false assumption leads to a further inability to persuade Muslim audiences and
creates a greater divide between Americans and Muslims. One of the underlying assumptions
that our nation continues to perpetuate is that ―all Muslims have an innate, albeit repressed,
desire to support both liberal democracy and capitalism‖ (van Ham 432). This kind of thinking
dismisses any alternative kind of society as possessing value and presumes we know what way
of life is best for Muslims. The assumption that all Muslims seek a society reflective of our own
not only disregards their cultural values but further alienates Muslims, making it harder for us to
reach our public diplomacy goals (Zaharna 3). The failure of several of our past diplomatic
initiatives shows how the idea that all Muslims wish for a version of democracy is not an
accurate reflection of this target audience. In fact, these initiatives may have resulted in an even
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greater objection to American values and further promoted a negative perception of the U.S.
throughout the Muslim world. 9
Americans must understand that many of our values are not the same as those of Muslims
despite the fact we may believe they should be; we need to accept this reality and find an
alternative way to communicate (Corman, Tretheway & Godall 178). R.S. Zaharna explains how
efforts that focuses on promoting ―American culture and values may have inadvertently fueled
an awakening across the Islamic world to protect and promote their own cultures and values‖ (3).
With our response to the events of September 11, 2001 and the initiation of various extended
efforts to convince people in the Middle East of our commonalities, the U.S. may have
unintentionally positioned ourselves as a greater threat to Muslim values rather than working to
create a platform that is conducive for communicating with one another. We continue to face the
problem that American public diplomacy messages and actions in our War on Terror have been
interpreted as the U.S. ―impos[ing] Western values on Muslims‖ (Gregory, ―Public Diplomacy
and National Security‖ 3). Instead of embracing the values of others, the U.S. continues to force
our values on Muslims under the guise that our primary concern is bettering their lives.
Assuming American values are completely similar to theirs rather than recognizing and
respecting distinct differences, disregards Muslim values and results in our inability to persuade
them. This rhetorical approach is a contributing factor that leads Muslims to the conclusion that
the U.S. is not trustworthy.
9
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Many experts have argued that in order for public diplomacy to be successful, the
message must be credible (Epstein 12). The debate over truth and credibility has always been
pertinent in American public diplomacy. As we have seen, the past tactics of the VOA, USIA,
and Marshall Plan have helped our nation succeed in reaching its goals without always being
entirely accurate or truthful. Ideally, American public diplomacy efforts should stem from a
sincere foundation where differences are acknowledged and audiences do not feel they are being
force fed a particular way of life. Edward Murrow states, ―American traditions and the American
ethic require us to be truthful, but the most important reason is that truth is the best propaganda
and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be
credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that‖ (qtd. in Waller, The Public
158). Murrow describes persuasion as a simple process where the truth will allows us to
persuade others of our credibility and believability; arguably the truth can prove most useful to
achieving our goals but what demonstrates as most important is if the audience is persuaded of
such truths.
Although the ‗truth‘ is a complicated subject, what becomes significant is the emphasis
on truth; when rhetors are perceived as credible and truthful, they are better positioned to
persuade their audiences (Aristotle 25). The crafting of messages is extremely important in
persuasion; however our rhetorical focus on common values may no longer be useful, especially
when we dictate what constitutes universal values by which others should live. When the U.S.
primarily focuses on values, public diplomacy efforts are often dismissed by Muslims as
unbelievable because these tactics often ignore the political realities of U.S. foreign policy
(Zaharna 3). In order to strengthen American credibility and persuade Muslim audiences, at a
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minimum we need to be seen as credible and honest. To change the perception of the U.S. in the
Middle East, the executive branch must not dismiss the role rhetoric can play.
It is essential that as the Obama Administration makes new changes in strategy, the
executive branch continues to acknowledge the overwhelming power of words because ―words
matter and to act otherwise misses an opportunity for positive persuasion‖ (Corman, Tretheway
& Goodall 182). Although it has been argued that words are meaningless without any actual
policy changes, which is important; nevertheless, as public diplomacy history has shown us,
words are useful in influencing worldwide opinion and possibly ―the most powerful weapons in a
war of ideas‖ (Waller, Fighting 38). Therefore, we must understand that although truth ideally
should play an important role in public diplomacy rhetoric, persuasion happens when we
convince others that we are credible and truthful. However, we continue to fail—both in our
foreign policy and public diplomacy rhetoric. For that reason, policy and rhetoric must go hand
in hand and in order to reach our goals they must be addressed simultaneously. Policy and
rhetoric rely on one another and should be approached by the very symbiotic nature that exists
between them. In order to establish U.S. credibility we must stop relying on one-way
communication techniques that are absent of listening with minimal dialogue that were used
heavily in the past.
One-Way Communication
American public diplomacy has long relied on a variety of communication techniques in
reaching its audience, but the primary mode has been through the continued use of one-way
communication. Historically, our communication strategies have come from a place of power
that controls the communicative process resulting in this single sided communication (DuttaBergman 117). One-way communication has often been through print advertising, radio and
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television broadcasting where no interaction, relationship, or dialogue is created. The problem
with relying primarily on this kind of communication is that it dismisses one of the most
important aspects of public diplomacy—relationship building with balanced dialogue that
promotes understanding and interaction. This one-way approach becomes problematic because
our public diplomacy efforts often result in a propaganda-laden agenda with the goal of
―massaging the minds of the public [and] on building an image and shifting public opinion about
the United States‖ instead of creating an opportunity for open equal dialogue (Dutta-Bergman
116). Although policy changes would help alleviate this problem, we must also communicate in
ways that create open relationships based on mutual interaction and understanding which can
lead others to become more open to American ideas and working together to solve worldwide
issues. Productive, lasting relationships with other nations will likely not succeed without open
communication, for if we continue to use single-sided communication it will only bring us
further from our public diplomacy goals.
Using ―one-sided‖ communication primarily in the form of marketing and advertising is
problematic because it is perceived as ―an effort to manipulate worldwide opinion‖ (Corman,
Tretheway & Goodall 182). The use of one-sided communication results in a power dynamic that
projects the image of the U.S. as a hegemonic entity that is trying to impose our political
ideology and democratic values everywhere. By using one-way communication the U.S. is
further framed unrealistically—as lacking any flaws and characterized of optimal virtue. This
image is especially problematic because many U.S. actions are not reflective of American values
that we work to spread throughout the world, further establishing the U.S. as hypocritical and
therefore untrustworthy. Arguably real changes in public diplomacy will happen once we choose
to conduct ourselves differently, but this needs to take place both through changes in foreign
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policy and rhetoric. To be more persuasive, we must work on our credibility. To enhance others
trust in us, the U.S. needs to avoid using deceptive motives when in reality our main concern is
U.S. interests. In order for others to trust the U.S. we must try to conduct ourselves by the very
values we claim represent us and accurately communicate our motives even if it may not reflect
positively on the U.S.
A 2010 opinion poll on perception of the U.S. in the Middle East shows that despite the
Obama Administration‘s efforts to improve credibility and goodwill towards the U.S. following
his election, the views towards the U.S. and President Obama are on the decline (Telhami ―2010
Arab‖). Consequentially, this continued negative perception is the result of the executive
branch‘s continued reliance upon a ―hegemonic model of communication‖ in public diplomacy,
efforts that do not emphasize mutual dialogue or two-way communication (Nelson & Izadi 343).
In order for the U.S. to persuade Muslim audiences and bridge the credibility gap we must use
other forms of communication while understanding that even if we may lack common values
collaboration on some level can be possible.
Implications for Public Diplomacy Research
This analysis of American public diplomacy is useful in understanding the current
context of public diplomacy, contributes to the growing field of public diplomacy research and
how our executive branch rhetorically reacts to crisis. With the recent interest in public
diplomacy, it is likely to develop into its own separate field and currently ―progress in public
diplomacy research is highly needed because of the central place it is now occupying in foreign
policy and diplomacy‖ (Gilboa 75). Therefore as public diplomacy becomes more important the
communication discipline can provide vital contributions to this research. Public diplomacy
scholarship is critical and future scholarship should embrace the many ways that rhetorical
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analysis can contribute to our understanding of how we engage the world. Fundamentally, public
diplomacy is about persuasion, thus it should not be ignored.
In this study I have identified a significant rhetorical pattern within American public
diplomacy that continues to perpetuate itself today. Further research should examine any
additional rhetorical patterns that we continue to see in American public diplomacy today. Also,
more analyzes of the ways that specifically current public diplomacy rhetoric impacts the
national identity of our targeted audiences would be useful. In discussing our current rhetorical
choices research should also explore the possible ethical implications we encounter when using
such rhetoric. My analysis of the 2007 NSPDSC provides an important use of rhetoric within the
document, but a further in depth analysis from other lens could provide more insight into how we
choose to persuade foreign audiences.
Closing- Lasting Public Diplomacy
As my analysis has shown, since the founding of the U.S. through the 19th century to both
World Wars, Cold War and to the War on Terror a pattern of public diplomacy rhetoric
continues to be reiterated and remains a central tenet in American history. Although the Obama
administration and the newest Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith
McHale have yet to release another communication strategy, a ―framework‖ for forthcoming
changes to U.S. public diplomacy has been put forth by Under Secretary McHale. In March 2010
Undersecretary McHale released a 33 page power-point presentation at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing titled "The Future of Public Diplomacy" which is to serve as a
―framework‖ or ―roadmap‖ for forthcoming changes in U.S. public diplomacy. 10 The main
themes she outlines are to focus on shaping the narrative, expanding people to people
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relationships or citizen diplomacy, combat violent extremism, better inform policy making, and
deploy resources for better and more developed structure including new positions in order for
public diplomacy to be more effective (McHale ―Future of U.S. Diplomacy‖). Although a
detailed communication strategy has yet to be created, this framework possesses many
similarities to past American public diplomacy rhetoric. As we anticipate the forthcoming
strategy and changes in American public diplomacy, it is important to remember that as our
world becomes more interconnected public diplomacy will likely play a larger role throughout
the world and must not be dismissed as insignificant for it is ―part of the fabric of world politics‖
(Melissan 6). While the U.S. moves towards future diplomacy it is vital that we remember the
past and recognize the many ways our history can impact the present.
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